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Increased trade, improved communications,  respond to variations in fiscal deficits. Finally, in
growing internationalization of production, and  evaluating the costs and benefits of legally
legalization of foreign currency instruments have  opening the capital account, it is important to
increased access to international capital markets.  consider just how open the capital account really
Developing country govemments are beginning  is and to what extent existing regulations merely
to consider complementing increasingly open  shift the burden of implicit taxes onto those with
goods markets with de jure capital account  less access to foreign exchange.
liberalization. To assist this analysis, Hanson
surveys the costs and benefits of opening domes-  Most evidence about the impact of capital
tic capital markets and including some practical  account liberalization comes from industrial
issues.  countries. Available evidence suggests that
developing cour:tr es with stable policy environ-
Capital account liberal  a.tion  provides  ments could benefit from opening the capital
greater access to foreign financing for aggregate  account: domestic real interest rates would
investment. It also allows individuals to diversify  decline, and there might be a 10 to 15 percent
and protect themnselves  against risks more easily.  increase in investment, which also might bring
But individuals often seek to protect themselves  better technology and management with it.
against actual and potential govermment  policies.
This may lead to reduced domestic saving when  Reasonable fiscal balance and a sound
the capital account is opened, particularly in an  domestic financial system are preconditions to
unstable policy environment.  successfully opening the capital account. With-
out these preconditions, capital flight may occur
Open capital accounts reduce the ability to  or the government may have to bail out domestic
tax capital and to conduct monetary policy  banks. Capital account liberalization can, to
(under a fixed exchange rate). They also increase  some extent, be phased with current account
a country's  exposure to external monetary  liberalization by legalizing and limiting different
shocks. But the loss of tax and monetary inde-  instruments and institutions to varyir.g degrees.
pendence brings an offsetting benefit: the  Finally, trade liberalization programs and
government's  incentive to undertake such  exchange rate policy need to be viewed not only
policies is reduced, which lessens the risk of  in terms of maintaining current account balance
policy instability. An open capital account also  but also how they affect the real interest rate and
may enhance the ability to conduct fiscal policy,  investment, through the capital account.
depending on how international investors
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A.  Introduction
The  increase in  trade,  the  increasing internationalization  of  production and  the
improvements  in communications,  together with the legalization  of foreign currency instruments  in a
growing  number  of countries,  have led to a defacto liberalization  of the capital account. In line with the
greater reliance on open goods  markets and a defacto opening  of the capital account, developing  country
governments  naturally are raising questions  aJout fully opening the capital account.  As a background
to answering such questions, this paper surveys the existing literature on opening up domestic capital
markets, much of which was written prior to the debt crisis, ae it applies  to the current situation.
In this context, it should be noted that this survey defines a liberalized  or open capital
market as one in which individuals  and firms can access international  financial  markets freely, not just
one in which the government intermediates  international  capital flows to balance differences in private
saving and investment. In fact, private agents  in many  developing  countries  cutrently  have greater access
to international  capital markets than their governments,  particularly given the possibilities that private
agents have for collateralizing  their debt.  Ibis situation  is a dramatic  reversal of the situation  of the late
1970s, when developing  country governments  intermediated  large volumes  of foreign funds at low real
interest rates while private agents  lacl.ed comparable  access to international  capital.
This survey begins with a brief summary  of the costs and benefits of capital account
liberalization.  paying  particular  attention  to the issue  of the loss of policy  effectiveness  and noting  the new
theories of capital flows based on international  portfolio diversification  of risky assets, which raise the
possibility  of benefits from capital account liberalization  that are not linked solely to higher investment
rates.  The survey then reexamines  dte evidence  on the results of open capital account.  Unforunately,
much of the evidence  relates to industrial countries and much of the evidence  relating to developing
countries relates to the turbulent  period in Mexico and the Southern Cone at the end of the 1970s and
beginning  of the 1980s. Finally, the survey reexamines  the question  of sequencing  the liberalization  of
the current and capital  accounts, to provide a background  for programs to liberalize  the capital account.2
B.  The Costs and Benrilts of Capital Account Liberailzation
B. 1  The Traditional Analysis
The traditional  welfare analysis  of capital  account liberalization  in a developing country
focuses  on the benefits  of allowing  foreigners  to own more domestic  capital  (MacDougall). This analysis
begins from a situation  of autarchy, analogously  to the traditional  analysis  of the welfare implications  of
free trade. In autarchy,  the rate of return in the domestic  market is assumed  to exceed  the rate in the rest
of the world.  Once the capital account is opened up, this differential generates a capital inflow and a
larger capital stock in the home country. In the final equilibrium,  GDP is higher because of the larger
capital stock.  Domestic  laborers gain at the expense  of both domestic and foreign owners of capital, so
GNP also is higher.  A similar analysis  applies in the growth theory context, foreigaers will support a
higher level of capital in country  at lower cost, in terms of foregone  consumption,  than domestic  saving
alone. (See Annex)
The traditional  analysis seems more appropriate  to liberalizing  the rules governing
direct foreign investment  than to liberalizing  the rules on financial flows or the capital account as a
whole.  In effect, foreign investors are assumed to bring in capital goods and take away part of the
additional  production, thereby resolving  the transfer problem and leaving the country better-off  because
of higher demand for its labor.  According  to this analysis, financial  flows would raise welfare only to
the extent  that they lead to a higher capital  stock.  Analogously  to the optimum  tax on trade, this analysis
suggests that welfare may be increased by taxation of foreign capital inflows, if their supply to the
country  is not perfectly elastic  or depends on the total volume of the country's borrowing as well as the
returns to individual  projects (Kemp, Hanson (1974)).
Tbis analysis indicates  only that more foreign saving is desirable.  Since foreign saving
could be intermediated  by the government's borrowing externally, the analysis has no implication  for
opening  the capital account  to all participants.
In  addition,  by  effectively beginning from  autarchy,  this  analysis  ignores  the
substitutability  that exists between  an open current account  and an open capital account. As Samuelson
(1948) and Mundell  (1968 (a)) point out,
Commodity movement is almost certainly a substitute for factor movements, in this
sense: if trade does not originally  equalize  factor  prices and this causes factors  to migrate
so as to wipe out the difference,  none the less before  migration  has proceeded  far enough
to equalize  factor proportions, factor migration  will come to a stop as commodity  trade
either will have equalized factor returns or will have so reduced the differential as to
make the  cost of  transporting another unit of the factor greater than the present
discounted  value of the higher  earnings  it can hope to secure abroad. (Samuelson,  1948)
Thus, within the standard Hecksher-Ohlin  world, opening  the current account lowers the rental rate on
capital - and the interest rate (See Samuelson  (1965))  - in the country  with more abundant  capital while
raising it in the other. Capital  account  liberalization  and current account  liberalization  thus are substitutes
in the standard  trade models. These models  imply that the capital  account  need not be opened  to equalize
rates of return if the trade accour.t is fully open.  Of course this process will take time.  Even in the
United States, where internal capital flows were free, there were significant  and persistent per capita3
Income differentials  (see for example  Barts and Stern), probably  associated  with differential returns on
real capital. Moreover, this argument  does not contradict  the desirability  of opening the capital account
in order to obtain direct foreign investment  that would  bring with it technology  that cannot  be transfe-  -ed
effectively  through licenses or trade.'
B.2  Intertemporally based trade and capital flows
The standard  Hecksher-Ohlin  model  determines  the pattern of trade based on the relative
abundance  of factors, ignoring  differences in demand  patterns. Intertemporal  considerations  enter only
to the extent that differences in time preference explain  differences in saving and, ultimately, in factor
propornions. 2 In contrast, intertemporal  differences  in production are the traditional starting point for
models of forward markets (See for example, Stein). Intertemporally,  seasonality  can be smoothed  to
some degree within  an economy  through forward contracts  and storage. However, if two countries  have
seasonally-opposite  patterns of production, then, in theory, international  trade in goods and financial
claims could smooth consumption  at less cost (Stockman  and works cited there).
For example, Southern Hemisphere  producers could export temperate zone products
produced during  their  summer to  the  Northern Hemisphere during  its  winter.  Rather  than
*.ontemporaneously  importing  goods with the export proceeds- a continuously  balanced  current account
matched  by a balanced-at-zero  capital account  - Southern  Hemisphere  producers  might  build up financial
claims  on the Northern Hemisphere  producers. These claims  could  be exercised  later, during the harvest
season in the Northern Hemisphere.  Over a year, the trade and the capital account each would be
balanced,  but in each semester  the current and capital  account  would  show equal  but opposite  imbalances.
Provided  the relevant transport costs were less than the storage costs, real resources would be saved by
allowing  international  trading in financial  claims.
While interesting  theoretically, this model does not yet seem to have much empirical
applicability. For example,  although  Chilean  temperate  zone fruits and vegetables  are abundant  in winter
markets in the Northern hemisphere, the reverse trade does not seem to have developed. Whether this
is because differences in market size and/or seasonal  variations in transport costs make exporting the
Northern hemisphere's summer production to  Chile unprofitable, or  because of  residue! Chilean
protection is hard to say.
In addition, on a  theoretical plane, the argument simply suggests that international
borrowing and lending could reduce the costs of  intertemporal  differences between production and
consumption,  which does not necessarily  mean a fully open capital account. One theoretical  alternative
would be for the government  to build  up and run down  international  reserves during the year  - individual
preferences  could be indulged  by allowing  forward trading against  the country's reserves.  Of course an
open capital account would  be the most straightforward  solution  to obtaining  the benefits  of trade based
on intertemporal  considerations.
' See Moran  for a discusion of a theory  of direct  foreign  investment  along  thes lines.
2  See Deardorff  and Hanson  for a two-country  model  that links saving  rates, and factor  proportions  and the pattern  of trade  over time.4
B.3  RIsk
Recent analysis  emphasizes  the role of risk bearing and risk sharing in financial markets
and, by extension, international  financial  markets. If the prices for bearing or sharing certain risks differ
between  couatries, then  there would  be gains from trade in international  financial  assets embodying  these
risks that are analogous  to the gains from international  trade in commodities  (Svensson,  and Persson and
Svensson). 'All of the arguments  against  restricting  international  trade in goods also apply  to restricting
international  trade in financial assets, whether these restrictions occur in the forms of direct controls,
taxes or regulation  of financial  intermediaries."  (Stockman,  p. 536)  Similarly,  all the caveats regarding
the benefits of free trade in goods also would apply  to the benefits  of free trade in risky assets.
Bringing  in the element  of risk is thus a major shift from the traditional  analysis  of capital
flows,  because  it delinks  the welfare  implications  of an open capital  account  from its effect on investment.
Evet  if saving and  Investment are unaffected by allowing capital  flows, i.e. even if the private
capital account were exactly balanced by inflows and outflows of capital, the individual agents of
the economy would beneflt from trade In risky assets. 3 Moreover, the argument that individuals
should be allowed to trade assets internationally bnjed on differences in preferences, production and
evaluation  of :isk, is, analogously  to the trading of cemmodities,  perhaps the strongest  argument  for open
capital markets in the sense defined in the introduction.
B.4  Taxation, and the Risk of Taxation
Developing  country analysts, when asked to rationalize a closed capital account, often
answer with some of variant of "otherwise  we would lose J1 our savings".  In terms of the traditional
analysis,  this view suggests  that capital in the country  would fall if the capital account  were opened. If
this view were true, it would suggest  that the rate of return in the economy  is  1§n  than tht rate of return
in the rest of the world.  However, developing  countries generally  are thought to have lower levels of
capital per worker than develuped countries, which should imply higher rates of return in developing
countries in the absence  of capital movements.
Underlying country risk, unrelated to country policy, is one possible explanation  for
outflows of capital from developing  countries, despite domestic  rates of return that -xceed world rates.
For example,  borrowers  from a mono-exporter  would  face a risk premium in international  markets  related
to the price risk on the mono-export;  residents  would try to diversify their assets into instruments  that
have a  different risk.  However, an open capital account might also attract investors interested in
diversifying  their portfolios  by purchasing  assets  with a different  risk return tradeoff  than prevails in their
own countries. Gross capital outflows  would  certainly  occur, but the effect on the capital account would
depend on the balance of the inflows and the outflows, and the degree to which the mono-exporter
allowed  the development  of attractive  instruments  for foreign investors.
Taxation and the risk of taxation probably are a more important explanation  for the
apparent  paradox of capital outflow from what should be high return countries  than underlying country
'  Of cours,  this sumec  diffeences  in the autcehic  prices  of compable  risky aets  acros countries. Svensson  develops  a model in
which  trdes in assu may  occur  bece  of difrnces  in the autarchic  pricing  of simiar riks and  because  of differences  in the  autarchic  pricing
of payments  over a given time span.5
risk.  To investors, high taxes and potential taxes on capital in dvweloping  countries, including the
possibility  of expropriation,  easily could offset higher-than-international  rates of return to capital and
financial  asses.
The tax issue is compounded  by the tax preferences  offered foreigners  in many  industrial
countries and banking centers.  Offshore banking centers, and many industrial countries, do not tax
interest earned on savings accounts  or, at least, interest earned by foreign holders of savings accounts.
For example,  the United  States  has not taxed interest  income  on savings  accounts  belonging  to foreigners
since the 1970s.  Moreover, competition  for deposits among financial centers has meant that data on
foreign owners of deposits is  not available to income tax authorities  in the country of origin - if one
center were to provide the information,  then tax considerations  would cause capital to shift to other
centers.  The differential tax treatment of foreign and domestically  owned deposits could, in theory,
given rise to two-way  capital  flows based on tax avoidance,  so called round-tripping  (Tanzi and Blejer).
Taxation  of financial  instruments  takes many forms beside simple income taxation. For
example, inflation represents a tax on all financial instruments  that have zero or fixed interest rates.
Reserve  requirements  that are unremunerated  or carry fixed remunerations  are another  way of imposing
the inflation  tax.  However, the incidence  of the implicit tax arising  from reserve requirements  may fall
on depositors or borrowers. This means  that, with an open capital account, an increase in the inflation
tax on reserve requirements  may  motivate  capital inflows  as well as outflows. For example,  with an open
capital account, depositors in banks would be able to demand deposit rates equivalent  to international
rates. This would mean  that the impact  of higher-than -ternational  costs of reserve requirements  would
be felt solely in lending rates, where differences  in information  reduce competition  between foreign and
domestic  banks more than in deposit taking.  The higher lending rates, in turn, would induce foreiga
banks to increase  their direct lending  from home  offices, thereby generating  a capital  inflow. Firms that
could  borrow internationally  would do so, another source of capital inflows.
The risks of potential  taxation,  as well as actual  differences  in taxes, represent  a rationale
for "capital  flight".  The potential for higher future taxation  means that domestic financial  assets must
carry a risk premium to be equivalent,  in the minds of potential  asset holders, to assets in the rest of the
world. 4 There also exists a risk that a country may default on its international  obligations, over and
above  the risk associated  with individual  projects  (See Dooley  and sard, and Hanson  (1974)). Thus there
may be a number of risk premia, in addition to the risk premia associated with the various forms of
taxation, and differences in the variability in inflation, the exchange  rate, and domestic interest rates.
These  risk premia, and changes  in them, are one explanation  of the imperfect  substitutability  between  the
financial assets of different countries.  They also explain why interest rates may be  higher than
international  rates in countries  that are presumed  to have low capital-labor  ratios. Such risk pr3mia  have
a real cost, in terms of reducing the domestic  capital-labor  ratio and domestic  consumption  below what
it otherwise  would be (See the Annex).  Hence, any policies that can reduce this risk premium would
tend to raise GNP.
To summarize,  'country risk" explains  why an open capital account  might lead to capital
outflows  from what are potentially  high return countries. Capital account controls are needed in order
'  See fof example  Do.'e v.  Ihe exisence  of such  rsk  premia,  and  the posbility that foreigcn  will be Usated  more favorably  than
domesic  aset  holders,  can lad to simulneos  bomwiAng  abroad  and capitai  outflows (Dooley,  Dornbusch  (1984), Khan and Haque).6
to tax domestic capital at higher-than-international  rates.  To the extent that the capital acccunt can be
kept closed, preventing  capital outflow  that otherwise  would  occur because  of higher rates of actual  and
potential taxation,  and to the extent that legal arrangements  can be made to offset the potential  negative
impact.  of these capital controls on ( ipital inflows, then the negative  effects of capital account controls
can be partially  offset. In these circu wstance,  there may, indeed, be costs of opening  the capital  account.
This is particularly true taking into account the distributional  implications  of being able to tax capital
more heavily than would be possible with an open capital account.
A critical question  is whether  the defacto internationalization  of capital already makes
it difficult to tax capital.  In answering this question, it is important  to note capital controls and high
taxation are likely to motivate attempts to internationalize  domestic capital, by establishing  channels
trough  which capital can be transferred  internationally. The longer  capital  controls  have been imposed,
the more porous  they are likely to be.  To the extent that capital  can be moved  fairly freely internationally
- for example by over-invoicing  imports and under-invoicing  exports -- then laws to keep the capital
account closed simply represent a  hinderance to  domestic capitalists, that encourages corruption.
Maintenance  of such ineffective  laws is not a valid reason for not opening  the capital aecount. 5
Moreover, since capital controls are only partially effective, they change the incidence
of taxation  of capital.  Some  types of capital can be moved  less easily internationally  than others, some
savers and investors have less access to international  markets than others.  These types of capital and
these agents  thus are more subject  to capital  taxation  than those that are defacto internationally  mobile.
If capital that is de facto internadonally  mobile also is owned largely by large capitalists, then any
favorable distributional  implications  of capital taxation cum capital controls may be reduced or even
reversed. Indeed.,  one argument  for allowing  an open capital  account  is that it allows all citizens,  not just
those with easy access  to foreign  exchange,  to reduce  the burden of taxes on savings,  such as the inflation
tax.
B.5  Open  Capital Markets as Limitations on the Effectiveness  of Policies
The possibility  of avoiding  taxes when the capital account is open is a one example  of
the general point that an open capital account  limits the impact  of government  policies. An open capital
account limits governments'  ability to tax capital or financial assets, to the extent that economic  agents
can easily switch their portfolios internationally  to escape taxes.  Although in a closed economy  the
impact  of various taxes also can be reduced, by substitution  in production  and consumption  into goods
with lower rates of taxation, in an open economy  even more options are available.
Another widely-known  example of how an open capital account may reduce policy
effectiveness  is MIundeil's  (1968)  analysis,  shoviirAg  that  monetary  policy  is ineffective  in a small economy
with a  fixed exchange rate, open capital markets, and perfect substitutability  between domestic and
foreign assets. 6 In Mundell's model, the domestic interest  rate is fixed by international  flows  of capital
and cannot be affected  by variations in the growth of domestic credit.  Thus monetary  policy becomes
'  This is even more  so to the extent  that govenments must make  special  legal armngements  to encourage eerain  capital inflows  by
eliminting  the  capital  controls  in particular  cases. Since  these  arrangements  typically  would require  governmont  controls  over  the inflows,  they
also might  encourage  misallocation  of resources  and cornrption. This  is another  cost of capital  controls  that must bo borne in mind.
6  Still aoother  examplo  is the possibility  that direct foreign investment  can offset protection  intended  to stimulate domestic,  import-
substituting  induy.7
in,ffective.  These and other examples  of policy ineffectiveness  often are cited as costs of opening  the
capital account. However, the importance  or even the correctiness  of this argument  is far fiom clear.
In  general, an open capital account does not  eliminate the effectiveness  of  policy
lastruments,  it only reduces  it.  In variants  of the Mundell  model,  price stickiness  and wealth  effects  mean
money policy does have a role in determining  output, even if interest rates are determined by free
international  capihl flows (Dornbusch, 1976).  In addition, imperfect stibstitutability  between assets
means monetary  policy can affect the differential  between  foreign and domestic interest rates (the "risk
premium' mentioned  above)  and thus change  the domestic  interest  rate, even  in a completely  open capital
market.
Targeting  the interest  rate, rather than the money  stock is another way tc take advantage
of the imperfect  substitutability  between  domestic  and foreign assets, although  it is likely lead to a loss
of international reserves.  To lower domestic interest rates, a government may offer to lend below
international  interest  rates or rollover  government  bonds  at less than world  rates. This will lead to capital
flight and loss of international  reserves. Thus, whether  this policy increases  investment,  or only capital
flight, depends on the elasticity of capital  oatflew.  Raising the interest rate, by offering interest  rates
above international  rates, may be more successfutl  in affecting (crtneduu) x  tet.  xuxxmingX
however, this policy also is likely to lead to a decline in net international  assets.  For example, the
Central Bank or the Treasury could maintain  domestic  interest rates above international  rates by selling
high interest rate bonds. This policy will attract net capital inflows  and raise the interest rate to domestic
borrowers. However, it also will generate net obligations  for the country, since the inflows  of capital
can only be invested  at the lower, international  rate.  The country's net external  obligations  will grow,
and eventually  raise the risk premium in world markets. Thus, the eventual  result of trying to target the
interest rate below or above the world rate is a loss in net reserves.  Since declining  net reserves often
are viewed as an indicator  of county risk, either policy is likely to lead to a rise in the interest rate
premium facing  the country in international  markets and, eventually,  to higher domestic interest rates. 7
Finally, if only the degree of effectiveness  of a policy variable  -- the impact multiplier
in the language of econometrics  - is changed when capital markets are opened up, then the ability to
make policy is not affected. A larger dose of the same instrument  will achieve  the desired effect. If the
application  of a policy instrument  has no cost, then changes  in the impact  multiplier  of are not important.
However, if the cost of using a policy instrument  does rise with the size of the intervention,  then there
may be some costs of capital account liberalization,  in terms of policy effectiveness,  but these must be
set against the benefits of opening  the capital  acceunt.
One option to overcome any loss of policy effectiveness  would be to use an alternative
instrument to achieve or to enhance the effectiveness  of a policy instrument.  For example, again
referring to the Mundell  model, the use of a floating exchange  rate, as opposed  to a fixed exchange  rate,
7  While  a govenment undoubtedly  can lower interest rates  to cetain preferred  borrowers  and to savers without  access to international
narkets, the  rulting  reduction  in the availability  of savings  will raise  interest  rates to the marginal  borrower.8
restores  the effectiveness  of domestic  monetary  policy  despite an open captal account.'  Thus, monetary
Independence  can be restored  at the cost of zhe  governmenlt's  giviag up control  over the nominal  exchange
rate and allowing it to float freely.  The free float clearly would eelai an Increase  in the variability of
the exchange  rate and correspondingly  greater risks for exporters  and importers  than a flxed iate system.
Viewed in this light, capital account controls, to the degree to which they can be made
effective, are simply an alternative to flexible exchange rates in making monetary 1olicy  effective.
Countries often have tried to use a different exchange rate or a free float only for capital account
transations  - in  effect trying to  create another policy instrument - in  order to obtain monetary
independence  or maintain control over the nominal exchange rate applicable to trade.  However, the
difference  between  the multiple exchange  rates, and thus the degree of monetary independence,  clearly
is limited  ty  the ease of arbitrage between  thn markets. 9
It a'so should be noted thttt the effectiveness  of some policies may be enhanced by an
open capital account. For examp!e,  in Mundell's  analysis, fiscal  policy becomes  more effective  with an
open capital account because there is less crowding-out." 0 Fiscal policy thus represents not only an
alkrnative instrument  to monetary  policy for the control of short run fluctuations  in aggcegate  demand,
but e:e which is enhanced  by an open capital  account. Any  cost of a decreased  effectivene-ss  of monetary
policy thus must be weighted  against  the benefit of an increased  effectiveness  of fiscal policy.
A more fundamental question is whether the changesi  in the effectiveness  o'  policy
instruments  represents a  cost to society.  If an open capital account permits residents to escape the
inflation tax, or other distortionary taxes, at low cost, then an open capital account does not a priori
renresent a cost to society  defined as the sum of individuals;  it may even be a benefit.
Some authors have extended this argument: an open capital account, by placing a
limitation  on the effectiveness  of certain government  policies, reduces  the incentive  for their enactment.
Thus a country's  credibility  improves  and  the risk premium  may decline. However,  this argument  should
not be overstated. Even the most credulous  investors  recognize  that "a government  intent on extracting
an inflation  tax from its own residents ... has substantial  incentives  to deviate  from a regime of flexible
exchange  rates and capital mobility"  (Sargent,  p.  103). An open capital market can easily be closed if
the government wishes to engage in distortionary  policies.  Perhaps, the argument is better stated by
noting that once a capital account is opened, and maintained  open for some time, then the incentives  to
close it again are reduced, because many savers and investors will have diversified their portfolios
internationally  in the interim, and this will reduce the effectiveness  of policy and thus the incentive  to
engage in such policies.
In sum, it is difficult  to conclude  whether  the impLft of opening the capital account on
'ID Mundell's  model  ofasmalpl  Oneconomywith a floating  exchanrate,  a one-  increa in domestic  credit  depreciates  the  exchango
rate,  changing ither  national  output  or prices,  but not necaiy  the Intst  rte.  In  other  versdon  of the model,  with more complicated  policy
changes,  thedomestic  intest  rato  may alo  charge.
' Se  for example  Fleming,  Lanyi, )rs,  and Domnbusch  (1986). As Lnyl and  Gros, In  a fomal model,  point out, if there is a permanent
eonditio (shock)  that leads  to a diffence  betweon  the  two exchange  market, then abitrage  will develop  that  eventually  will  elirminate  the gap
between  the  two market  or wUI  rquire inteiventon  in both maket - in effect a tax-subsidy  arrangement-to  maintain  the gap.
'0  Of coume,  a fully open capital  ccount, a  defined  in this paper,  b  not ncessy  to achieve  this  sult - the  government  could  simply
borrow  or !end  intenaomaly a  needed  to cary out the  desred fial  poliay.9
the effectiveness  of policy  instruments  represents  a cost  oi a benefit  to society.
B.6 Instaility
Anather  common,  related  argumrnt  against  open  capital  accounts  is  that  they  can  lead  to
greater  instability. Flows  of "hot money"  not only can offset  monetary  policy,  as discussed  in the
previous  section,  they can cause  substantial  vareitions  in the nommal  and real exchange  rate, interest
rates,  and  output. An  open  capital  account  also  can  exaggerate  or offset  terms  of trade  shocks,  depending
on how  international  creditors  react  to such  shocks.
Economic  theory  suggests  that capital  inflows  are likely  to move  sympathetically  to a
terms  of trade shock  and thus  magnify  Its effect  (See  Annex). Moreover,  the experience  of a number
of countries  during  the d&bt  crisis  suggests  that  the problem  ef Importing  world  fluctuations  through  the
capital  account  is only pardy  a matter  of 'hot money". The debt problems  of the severely-indebted,
middle-income  countries  reflect  a period in which  private  medium-  and long-term  inflows,  as well as
short  term  inflows,  first  grew  to unsustainable  levels,  and  then  were  cut-off  at the same  time  as the terms
of trade collapsed  and real interest  rates were high.  Ile  initial inflows  reflected  unsustainable  and
contradictory  macroeconomic  policies  in the borrowing  countries,  but also  rapid  monetary  growth  in the
industrialized  countries  and, in the case  of oil exporters,  favorable  terms  of trade. 11 For the foreseeable
future,  such  lending  excesses  are u.Aikely  to recur. Nonetheless,  the experience  of this period  suggests
that  the flows  of external  capital  may  well  magnify  shocks.
An open capital  account  could,  in theory,  cishion temporary  fluctuations  in tradeables
and  their prices. To some  exteiit  that  may even  have  happened  in the mid-1970s  and at the beginning
of the '980s in some  petroleum  importing  countries. Among  the various  types  of capital  flows,  direct
foreign  investment  may be the best shock absorber,  since It acts like equity  rather than debt.  For
example,  Reynolds  shows  that  in Chile,  the flow  of resources  from  the copper  companies  to the country
were more  stable  than  the terms  of trade. However,  theoretically  and  empirically,  capital  inflows  tend
to move  sympathetically  to permanent  changes  in  the terms  of trade. This  means  that  at best  capital  flows
can ease  adjustment,  not substitute  permanently  for it.
The validity  of the instability  argument  is not, however,  solely  a question  of whether
capital  flows  move  pro-  or contra-cyclically  to variations  in international  prices. Rather,  it also  depends
on whether  the main source of domestic  fluctuations  is external  or internal, much like the classic
arguments  for and  against  the flexible  exchange  rates. If the main  source  of fluctuations  is variations  in
saving  and investment  rates  in the rest of the world  or variations  in the rest of the world's  evaluation  of
country  risk, and if the economy  is operating  under  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime,  then  an open  capital
account  might increase  fluctuations  (leaving  aside  the shock  absorber  argument)  because  these  shocks
would  enter through  the capital  as well as the current  account. However,  if the main source  of
fluctuations  is variations  in the balance  between  domestic  saving  and investment,  such  as those  that  arise
from unstable  domestic  policies,  then international  capital  flows could  reduce  fluctuations  in output.
Also, an open capital  account  makes  it difficult  to apply  the inflation  tax or conduct  an independent
"  lhe hisoric sect  suggs  that  there  was  t nmb  differace  between  prite  and  public  bonowing  from  the tandpoi of the rk
to th  borwing  cowuy.  May  developing  couy  government,  including  Chfle,  t had emphasid privateprive lending  witiout
government  guantes,  found  thnmslves  forced,  by  a combinadon  of domesdc  nd  etal  prsule,  to  taeb  rsponsbiliy for  priv  extenal
debt that  odginaily  had not  been  gumnteed  by the  governme.  bhese  natlonalzed'  debt conine to complicated  macroeconomic  policy
in many  countri even  today.10
monetary  policy, as noted in the last sub-section. Moreover, if a government  had a tendency toward the
erratic use of the inflation  tax, but could be convinced  to keep an open capital  account, then that capital
account policy would induce a more stable policy franmework  by reducing the incentives to use the
inflation tax.  Thus, the key issue is whether domestic fiscal and monetary policies tend to offset
fluctuations  in the domestic economy  or cause them.11
C.  The Results of Open Capital  Accounts
The foregoing theoretical  analysis  of capital account liberalization  suggests three ways
of judging or measuring the empirical outcome of an open capital account: the degree of linkage of
domestic and international  interest rates, the degree of linkage  between domestic and world saving and
investment,  and the extent of trade in risky assets. There is, however,  no empirical  analysis  of the extent
of or benefits  from trade in risky assets, other than to follow Bryant  and observe that an enormous  two-
way trade in financial assets has developed over the past thirty years" 2 and that this trade is probably
linked to trade in risky assets.  Hence, this section concentrates  on the first two approaches  to judging
the impact  of  zapital  account liberalization.
C. 1  The Linkage Between Domestic and International Interest Rates: Interest Parity
What is the linkage between  domestic and international  interest rates?  The usual basis
for empirical  analysis  is the theory  of uncovered  interest parity. If there were no impediments  to capital
flows and risk could be ignored, then economic  theory argues that capital seeks out the highest return
internationally,  adjusted  for the currency denomination  of the instruments. Arbitrage  means that, in
equilibrium, capital flows would generate so-called uncovered interest rate  parity between assets
denominated  in different currencies (Fisher 1930). Mathematically,
(1)  id  = i,' +  E(d (EXR)/dt)
where;
i;  =  the interest rate and subscripts indicate the rates domestically in domestic
currency (d) and internationally  in world currency (w)
EXR  =  the exchange  rate (domestic  currency/world  currency)
and
E(.)  indicates expectations  and d(.)/dt indicates  the rate of change over the relevant
period.
A premium, R, may  be added  to the equation,  to reflect  investors' perception  that the two
assets, of similar maturity and apparently similar risk characteristics,  are not perfectly substitutable
because of perceived  risk or actual and potential  impediments  in the markets."  Some explanations  for
this premium were noted in Section B, and in particular include the possibility  that the country may
impose capital account controls that prevent repatriation of interest income and capital or unilaterally
abrogate financial  contracts.  Of course, the largest such recent aorogation  of contracts occurred in the
debt crisis of the early 1980s,  when  various developing  countries  suspended  payments of external  public
debt service for various periods.  However, the possibility  of abrogation  of internal contracts also may
u Moreover,  this  trade  Is  severely  underestimated  in the  balance  of payments  accounts,  because  of the  use of differences  in stocks  at two
point in time,  rather  than  actual  transactions,  to nrasure  short  term  international  capital  flows.
"  Of course,  all investors  need not regard  the two assets  as perfect substitutes  (aside from the expectation  of devaluation)  to generate
uncovered  interest  rate parity,  only those investors  at the margin,  who would  presumably  hold some of both  aebts.  Many  investors  might  hold
only one of the assets.12
exist" 4; which could create a risk premium between  local assets and foreign  assets.  Moreover, domestic
interest rates quoted in "world" currency may differ from "world" rates in "world" currency by a risk
premium, to reflect  the possibility  of conversion  into  domestic  currency at unfavorable  terms, as occurred
for example,  with Mex-Dollars  in August  1982  (Ortiz,  p.90). 15 In developing  countries,  the risk premium
might be positively  related to the volume of foreign investment  or liabilities  (Dooley, Hanson, 1979),  as
well as to macroeconomic  policy variables.
The post-debt crisis overhang of debt may represent a new and potentially important
factor in raising the risk premium  facing some developing  countries. First, there is a risk that a country
with a debt overhang may impose new taxes, including  the inflation tax, to service the old debt, as
Krugman and others have pointed out.  Potential investors include the risk of such taxes in the risk
premium  that they would  require before  investing. Second, one alternative  to investing  in some countries
is the secondary  market in the country's debt - alternative  liabilities  of these countries  do not obviously
carry less risk of repayment  than the instruments  trading in the secondary  market." 6 Since the mid-
1980s,  this secondary  market has increased  in size and sophistication. Moreover, the "securitization"  of
countries' bank debts has allowed smaller investors to participate  and mutual funds to develop.' 7 The
effective interest rate in the secondary  market reflects both the investor's expectation  of debt service
payments  and the secondary  market price.  The secondary  market price typically  is below par, reflecting
many factors including  the market's expectation  of the probability  of future repayments  on contractual
terms  and the likely buyback  price under Brady  deals, "world"  rates, and other factors  (See, World  Bank,
World  Deb Tables 199019L,  Chapter 3.).  Hence,  the comparable  rate could  be a multiple of the original
terms  on the debt traded in the secondary  market, depending  on the difference  between  the investor's and
the market's expectation  of repayment. Whether or not such a rate is the appropriate  one for equation
(1), it nonetheless  must be recognized  that the availability  of high, albeit risky, returns in the secondary
market may well raise the rate of return that must be offered  to sophisticated  investors in order to induce
them to  hold financial assets in  the country, i.e. the debt overhang and the growing depth and
sophistication  of the secondary  market could have led to a rise in the premium in Equation 1, compared
to earlier years. 18
14  For example,  in 1982  the Argentine  Government  imposed  a rcduction  in domestic  interest paymens under existing  contracts;  in 19S9,
Argentine  and Brazilian  bank deposits  were converted  into long term bonds  with reduced  interest rates.
Ottiz (p. 81) sggesu  such a differential  wa common  in Mexico  in the 1970s. However,  the government  controlled  the domestic  interest
rates and adjused them only from timeto-time, so the differential  did not represent  solely market forces. (A similar  policy regime  existed in
Inda during the ltter  half of the 1980e  for non-resident  depoits).  Ihe Mexican  government  eventually  pegged the Mex-dollar  rates to the
corresponding  Eurodollar  rates.
1t h1is  applies not only  to official  liabilities,  but to domestic  bank depceits,  that also may not be paid as originally  agreed  - as noted,  the
governmenu  of Aina  and Brazil  both unilralUy  conveted a large volume  of bank deposis into long term bonds.
" Morcover  securitized  debt is beginninr  to trade outside  of developod  country  markets  and the market  of the issuing  country,  e.g. Umguay,
has a market  in Mexican  debt.
"  Notice  that this  argument  is somewhat  different  than the rebted expanation that new investors  would have to share  propoxtionately  in
the  fixed, capacity  of the country  to pay,  nd thus, at the margin,  can only expect  to get the same fraction  of the contractual  terms on exising
debt as existing  credito.  The  poit  here is that not only foreign  but domestic  investors  view the condary  market  as aa option, particulady
as capital  mnrkets  are opened. Another  related  expanation linking a rise in the risk premium  and the debt overhang is that taxes of one kind
or another  will have to be raised to pay existing creditors  - hence  the below-par  secondary  market  price even for countries  that have fully
erviced  interest  obligations  - and these taxes will fai equally  hard on any  now' investors.13
Some heavily indebted  countries  have attempted  to reduce the premium on new loans by
effectively  splitting  the market and offering  new investors  preferred status, either by preferential  servicing
of some instruments to  which international  as well as domestic investors have access (for example
Uruguay's dollar denominated  Treasury bills), or by collateralizing  new flows (see World Debt Tables
19,2Q2-1.pp.  35-36 for a discussion  of Mexican  borrowers  use of cjllateral). This approach  has met with
varying success, depending  on the perception  of country's ability  to provide  preferred status.
Does cipital account liberalization  result in uncovered interest parity in practice?  To
study this question,  a number  of analysts  have added  an error term to equation  (1) and estimated  variants
of the resulting  equation. Of course, such estimates  have a number  of problems. First the interest  rates
must be free, not fixed by the government  - this is usually  true in industrialized  economies, but often
not the case in developing  economies  (See Hanson  and Neal). Second, an expectations  mechanism  must
be described  to generate  a series for the (non-observable)  expected  rate of devaluation. Thus the estimate
is a joint test of the equation and the hypothesized  expectations  function.  The usual hypothesized
mechanism  for generating  expectations  is some version of rational expectations.  Another approach is
to use the covered interest parity equation  to generate  a test of the equality between the expectation  of
the future spot rate and the forward rate (See Cumby and Obstfeld (1984)). This however, does not
strictly  test uncovered  interest  parity, but 'covered'  interest  parity.  It also depends on a forward market
in which there is minimal  government  intervention  and to which there is widespread  access, not usually
common  in developing  countries.
Most studies of uncovered interest rate parity relate to  industrial countries or Euro-
currency rates (for example,  Cumby and Obsteld  (1981, 1984), Dooley and Isard, Frenkel and Levich
(1975, 1977, 1981), Hansen and Hodrick (1980, 1983), Hartman).  Only a few relate to developing
countries  (for example, Blejer (Argentina),  Hanson  and De Melo (Uruguay),  Lizondo (Mexico),  World
Bank ('984) (Colombia))  and few cover the period since the secondary  market developed.
The general result of the studies of industrial  countries is that uncovered  interest parity
does not hold, except perhaps in the EIuro-currency  markets, where the assets have similar default and
political risk characteristics. The explanations  for this failure of uncovered interest parity are varied.
Since many studies use the covered  interest arbitrage  condition  to reduce the test to the unbiasedness  of
the forward rate as a predictor of the future spot rate, one strand of argument relates to econometric
problems  with the use of spot and forward rates (See Cumby and Obstfeld, (1984)). Another strand of
argument relates to the "peso problem"  - if agents expect intervention  or a sharp change to occur, but
it does not materialize in the sample period, then the forward exchange rate will not be an unbiased
predictor of the spot rate in the sample. (See for example the discussion in Hansen and Hodrick).
Finally, Dooley and Isard argue from the persistent differential between the Eurodollar and domestic
German interest rate, that significant  risk of capital controls or other political risks could invalidate
uncovered interest parity.  The last explanation  is probably the most important for the developing
countries:  there may be a substantial  and time varying risk premium between  domestic and international
interest rates.  This argument does not, however, invalidate the argument that access to international
capital  markets can reduce domestic interest rates. 19
I" Some  authors  also test  the equality  of real  interest  rates  (See  for example,  Cunrry  and  Mishkin,  Mishkin,  and Cunby and Ostfeld  (1984)
and works  cited ther,  and, for developing  countries,  Blejer  and  Gil L£iaz  (Uugusy).  'tn light  of the rather trong  rejections  of uncovered  parity
and ar ante purchasing  power  parity, it is not surprisbig  that moat  of thes  tws  reject  the hypothesis  that expected  real rates are equal  across
currencies. Nonetheless,  the bilateral  correlations  computed  by Cumby  and  Mishkin  (1985) show  that  cx ante real  rates  tend to move  together,
even  when defined  using onshore  interet rates. (Obstfeld  pp. 65)14
Most studies  on uncovered  interest  parity in developing  countries  relate to Latin America
in the late 1970s  and early 1980s,  when exchange  rate policy and interest policy was aimed at limiting
inflation.  Moreover, substantial  government  external  borrowing  was used to support the exchange  rate
policy and large capital flight  oc=irred (See for example,  World Bank, Wodld  ievgIgpmenBI  1985,
and Dooley, Helke, Tryon and Underwood  for estimates). The results, discussed  below, suggest  that in
this period the uncovered  interest parity equation, (1), holds only by adding a substantial  risk premium
that varies to reflect the expectation  of a devaluation  that did not actually  occur for a long period - the
"peso problem" mentioned  above.
For Argentina,  Blejer shows that during the period of preannounced exchange rates
(1977-1981)  the difference between 30 day peso interest rates and Eurodollar rates at the end of the
month, adjusted for the actual change in the spot exchange rate over the month, was equal to  a
(statistically  significant)  constant ( which could be interpreted  as the average risk premium, plus 'white"
noise.  However, data  in  Calvo suggest that there was a  large  "spike" in  the premium as  the
preannouncement period  came to  a  close,  which  may  make  it  difficult to  draw  conclusions
econometrically  from this period.  Lizondo obtains a similar result for Mexico  during the period May
1977 through December 1980, using the forward discount  to measure expected  depreciation.  However,
domestic  interest rates as well as the exchange  rate were fixed in this period, leading to some questions
as to the result.
In Uruguay  and Chile, estimates  of the link between interest  rates and international  rates
also have  been made for the period  of preannounced  exchange  rate depreciation;  the results are somewhat
different from Argentina  in that in both countries  the data suggest  a relatively  constant  premium  over the
dollar interest rate,  despite the preannounced slowing of the rate of depreciation, i.e.,  the actual
depreciation  does not appear to enter significantly. Hanson  and De Melo show that during the period of
preannounced  exchange  rates the domestic  dollar rate was reflected  roughly  one-to-one  in the peso deposit
rate and the premium between  domestic dollar and peso deposits (i.e. eliminating  the country  risk) was
fairly large and constant, once adjustment is made for periods when low cost forward cover was
available. Blejer and Gil also find a large serial correlation  in the risk premium over uncovered  interest
parity.  In Chile, for much of the period of the fixed exchange rate, the sitertion appears similar to
Uruguay; the  average difference between the local peso interest rate and LIBOR in dollars was 21
percentage  points, with a standard  error of 3 percentage  points in the period 11/80-1/82  (See Edwards  and
Cox-Edwards  Table 3-4 pg. 63, by comparison,  the premium paid by Chilean borrowers in dollars on
international  markets over LIBOR averaged  only about 1 percentage  point).  One interpretation  of the
Uruguay and the Chilean data is that although  the actual rate of depreciation  did decline, there was a
roughly offsetting increase in the risk of a large, sharp devaluation as the degree of overvaluation
increased.
In Colombia, in contrast to the Southern  Cone countries  and Mexico,  the exchange rate
was not used as an anti-inflation  instrument  for long periods of time but legal capital controls existed.
Once the interest rate on one domestic  asset (cer4flcados  de deposito)  was freed, the premium over the
international  interest rate, adjusted for actual depreciation,  appears to be fairly constant for some time
(World Bank, 1984).2
Although  the opening  of the capital markets in the Southern Cone had been intended  to
0 See Uan and Edward, discuwed  in the next section,  for a sonewhat different  interprettion  of the Colombian  data.15
lower real interest rates, real interest rates rose in both Chile, and Uruguay; this reflected  the slow-down
in local inflation  coupled  with the constant  premium over a rising world interest  rate.  Real interest rates
also remained  high in Argentina  for similar reasons (Calvo). The sustained  use of the exchange rate as
an anti-inflation  instrument  in these countries, clearly complicates  the evaluation  of the impact  of open
capital markets on domestic  interest rates.
C.2  The linkage  Between Domestic and International Interest Rates- Capital Account
Openess
Rather than testing whether uncovered interest rate parity holds, Edwards (1985) and
Khan and Edwards try to estimate  the degree of openess of the capital account.  Their approach is to
hypothesize  that the domestic  interest  rate can  be represented  as a weighted  average  of the foreign  interest
rate adjusted  for expected  devaluation  (uncovered  interest parity) and domestic factors (D):
(2)  id =  b (iw  + E(dEXR/dt)) + (1-b) (D)
Thus, as b approaches  1 (is not significantly  different than one in statistical  terms) the domestic interest
rate is determined  by uncovered  interest rate parity and the capital account is fully open.  On the other
hand, as b approaches  0, the economy  is fully  closed  and international  interest rates and devaluation  have
no effect on the interest rate. In effect, this approach  argues that Equation  (1) omits  domestic  variables,
that (i) affect the risk premium and (ii) are correlated with the independent  variables so as to bias the
estimated  coefficient  of Equation  (1). The advantage  of this approach  is that it allows an estimate  of the
openess  of the economy;  in the case  of tests of uncovered  interest  parity, the hypothesis  is either rejected
or accepted with no intermediate  result possible.  Among the problems  with this approach, in addition
to the problems  associated  with the estimation  of expectations  of devaluation,  are (i) that b is not based
on a behavioral relation and may not be stable, particularly if the degree of capital account openess
changes  over time,  and (ii) defining  the appropriate  domestic  variables.
Edwards  (Columbia),  Edwards  and Khan (Colombia  and Singapore)  estimate  this model
using the excess supply  of money  as a proxy for the domestic  factors. Using  the technique  for Colombia
(1968-82) Edwards and Khan and Edwards show surprisingly high coefficients  for the international
interest rate,  despite the presence of legal capital controls.  Indeed, the results suggest that the
international  interest rate was passed  through almost one-for-one  in Colombia, as would be the case in
a fully open economy. However, the domestic variables proxying the excess supply of money - real
income, expected  inflation  and lagged  money  also enter significantly, 21 suggesting  the capital  account  was
not completely  open.  For Singapore,  not surprisingly,  the interest rate appears  to be wholly determined
by the wodd rate and the domestic  variables  are not statistically  significant.
Edwards and Cox-Edwards  (Chile)  use the same technique  for Chile in the period 1977-
82.  The external interest rate, adjusted for expectations  of depreciation is statistically significant.
(Because  of the "peso" problem noted above  - the exchange  rate was fixed for much of the period -
a Bayesian  estimate  of expected  devaluation  that increases  as the exchange  rate becomes  more overvalued
It  Colombia  followed  a policy of indexing  the exchange  rate during much  of this period. However,  the cdimation  separates tatisticaBy
the  world  interest  rate adjuded for devaluation  and the  expected  inflation;  both are statistically  significant. This stidtical senaration  may reflect
the sharp variadon  in the dollar  interet rate  in this period.16
is used as the estimated expectation  of devaluation.) However, the coefficient is surprisingly low -
statistically  less than one - despite Chile's supposedly  open capital account in this period.  Indeed, the
estimated  coefficient  is much lower than for Colombia,  although  the dejure capital controls in Colombia
were much stronger  than in Chile. It is worth  noting that the equation  does not perform well statistically
for Chile, suggesting  some estimation  problems. As noted  above, the difference  between the local, peso
interest rate and the LIBOR rate in dollars was fairly constant  over the pariod.
A more recent approach  (Haque and Montiel  (1990a and 1990b))  modifies  equation (2)
by substituting  the interest rate that would prevail in the absence  of capital movements  as a summary
variable  for 'domestic conditions". This analysis  then argues that this interest rate can be derived as the
inverse  function  of the money  supply  that would  prevail in the absence  of capital  flows. The authors  then
estimate  this counterfactual  money  stock, using  the standard IMP money  supply  accounting  identitye  and
the balance  of payments  accounts, as the money  stock less private capital inflows' 1. One can then either;
(i)  use this variable as part of a reduced form of the "domestic"  interest rate in the standard
money demand function, with its coefficient  equal to "b" in equation (2) (Haque and Montiel
(1990a and 1990b);  or
(ii) estimate  the closed economy  interest  rate directly  from the standard  money  demand function,
and then use the estimated  rate it to estimate  b in (2) (Riesen  and Yeches).
Haque and Montiel  apply  their technique  to 15 individual  developing  countries  of widely
diverse  characteristics,  and then to 27 countries  in a pooled  estimation. The sample  period is 1969-1987
in both cases.  Broadly speaking  the results suggest  a surprisingly  high degree of capital mobility  - in
10 of the 15 individual  country  b is significantly  larger than zero but not significantly  smaller than one
in a statistical sense, and for the pooled sample b  is estimated at 0.93 which statistically  is very
significantly  different than zero but not significandy  different  than one.
Reisen and Yeches estimate much a much lower, though still statistically  significant
degree of capital mobility  in Korea and Taiwan, China. Their data also permits a rough estimate  of the
impact  of private capital flows on the interest rate.  For Korea it appears  that, on average, the access  to
international  capital flows that prevailed lowered the "curb" interest rate about 4 percentage points
compared  to what otherwise  would  have been the interest  rate.  In Taiwan, China, where the estimated
degree of capital account  openess  was lower, there appears  to have been only a minimal  impact  of private
international  tiows on interest rates.
C.3  Internatlonal  Linkages  between  Savings  and  Investment
A second approach to testing the implications  of open capital accounts  focusses on the
links between domestic saving and investment  and international  saving and investment. "With perfect
capital mobility, there should be no relation  between domestic  saving and domestic investment:  saving
=  Money wpply  equab  mrves phl  domteo credit.
"  lbe use of privete  capital  flows  alone may  bias  the  remuta  downward.  To the  extent  that  the public ector  borrows internationally,  rather
that  domestically,  the  interest  rae would  be bigher. Thee also  are questions  of whether  private  capital  outflows,  as well as inflows,  should  be
ued, and  whether  direct  forelgn investmer should  be included  in the  caculation.17
in each country  responds  to the worldwide  opportunities  for investment,  whUe  investment  in that country
is fin2nced  by the worldwide  pool of capital." (Feldstein  and Horioka, p. 317)
In fact, for most  countries,  and especially  for OECD  countries,  domestic  saving  represents
over 85 percent of investment  on average; foreign saving represents  only a small fraction of domestic
investment.  This observation suggests that although an open capital account could allow domestic
investment  to move independently  of domestic saving, in practice the two variables would be close
together. Feldstein  and Horioka's well-known  paper makes  this point econometrically;  they estimate  the
equation:
(3)  ([/GDP) 1 =  a +  b (S/GDP) + u;
where;  I  =  Domestic  Investment
S  =  Domestic  Saving
GDP  =  Gross Domestic  Product
i indicates  a specific  country average over the period, and;
u is an error term assumed  to have the usual properties.
Feldstein  and Horioka find values of b ranging  from 0.91 to 0.87 for average saving  and investment  rates
for OECD countries in the period 1960-74,  depending  on the exact period and the countries covered.
The estimated  coefficients  are not significantly  different from one at the 95% level of significance,  i.e.
the difference  between the coefficient  and one is less than two standard errors of the coefficients. The
estimated  constant, which roughly corresponds  to the average current account balance  for the countries
over the period (see equation (4) below), is usually  not significantly  different  than zero at the 95% level
(Feldstein  and Horioka, Table 2, pg. 321).  Feldstein  and Horioka interpret  their results to show that
"While a small part of the world capital stock is held in liquid form and is available to
eliminate  short-term  interest  differentials,  most capital  is apparently  not available  for such
arbitrage-type  activity among long-term investments.  Similarly  our finding of the very
close link between domestic saving and investment  does not conflict  with the existence
of substantial  international  flows of long-term portfolio and direct investments. Much
of the direct investment  is made in foreign  countries  to enhance  trade positions  or to take
advantage  of special knowledge;  such investment  will not be sensitive  to differences  in
savings rates or relative capital intensities. While some direct and portfolio investments
are made in pursuit of higher yields per se, the extent of such investment  is apparently
limited by institutional  barriers and portfolio preferences." (Feldstein and Horioka, p.
328)
In a later paper, Feldstein says, "It is reasonable  to interpret  the Feldstein-Horioka  findings  as evidence
that there are substandal  imperfections  in the international  capital market and that a very large share of
domestic  savings  tends to remain in the home  country"(pp. 130-131). A number  of studies using similar
data have obtained results similar to Feldstein  and Horioka.24
Whether all these results say anything  about capital mobility, except in the traditional sense of
F'  For  example  Feldstein,  3ayouni, Penati  and  Dooley,  Fielke,  Summrs, Capno and  Howard,  and  Dooley,  Frenkel  and  Mathieson,  which
conutins  a useful  summay  table  of earlier resuls.18
its supplementing  domestic savings, is another question. National accounts  imply that by definition:
(4)  (I/GDP)  =  (SIGDP)  - (CA/GDP)
where CA  =  the current account.
The negative  of the current account is the net capital flow, including  reserve movements. Even if net
capital flow Is small and not related to investment,  there can be significant gass  capital flows, or
significant net capital flows offset by reserve movements  that reflect government intervention  in the
foreign exchange market.  As noted in the introduction  to this section, gross c  apital flows are the most
rapidly growing element in the balance  of paym'  ,
The conflict  between  the Feldstein-  norioka result  and the casual  observation  of apparently
high, if not pewfect,  degree of capital mobility is nonetheless  so great that a number of authors have
sought to explain the result and demonstrate  strong capital mobility. One approach is to focus on some
important  econometric  and data questions. Using equation  (3) as a regression equation is equivalent  to
assuming  that the current account is normally distributed  and independent  of the domestic saving rate.
Given the small number  of observations  in the Feldstein-Horioka  results, it is difficult  to say much about
the distribution  of the residual  (the current account). However,  it is well known  that the domestic  savings
rate, S/GDP, usually is estimated  as a residual in the national  accounts, with the investment  rate and the
current account estimated  independently. Thus it is quite possible that the assumed error term and the
savings rate are not indepensdent,  creating  a bias in the regression results.
Sachs (1981, 1983)  estimated  equations  of the form:
(5)  (CA/GDP),  =  a  +  b((I/GDP) 1 +  u;
which avoids this criticism-there are errors of measurement  but they are independent  of the error term
(which is S/GDP,  by the national  accounts  identity). Sachs' results generally  show that the investment
ratios have a statistically  significant  relationship  with current account  deficits in the OECD. This would
seem to contradict the Feldstein-Horioka  results.  However, Penati and Dooley's results suggest that
Sachs' results are sensitive  to the choice of sample period and countries.
Another explanation  of the Feldstein-Horioka  results focusses  on the possibility  that the
high correlation  of the average  rates of domestic  saving and investment  across the sample countries does
not imply immobility  of capital internationally. In some sense this argument is a version of Lucas'
critique: if all countries  have similar investment  productivity  and savings  functions  with similar  arguments
and 'exogenous" variables, then it is not surprising  that, on average, there is a close relation between
domestic saving and investment  (Harberger, 1979). Simply put, what can one say about international
capital mobility  from a sample  of countries  that on average have zero current account  deficits?
Cumby demonstrates  the point rigorously:  using a standard  result of the life cycle model
that savings and investment  rates are correlated with population  growth (and rates of labor augmenting
technical progress) and the share of capital, he shows that OECD country data would generate a high
correlation  between average rates of saving and of investment,  even if capital were completely  mobile.
Summers and  Dooley, Frenkel and Mathieson develop this  critique empirically; they show that
developing  countries  have a much lower coefficient  than  the OECD countries  and when  they are included
in the pooled sample, the coefficient  of savings drops sharply, although  the difference  is not significant19
due to the relatively  large standard  errors of the coefficients.  I  To some extent the developing  country
results may reflect large aid flows to countries with low incomes and/or underdeveloped  statistical
systems, rather than greater private capital flows.  Some of the middle income countries had much
smaller differences  between domestic saving and investment,  bWt  this reflects reserve accumulation  and
private capital outflow, as discussed  above. For the more highly indebted of these countries, the stock
of private lending to some developing  countries exceeds their GDP (World Bank, World Debt Tables
122M*), which is a substantially  greater fraction of foreign owned capital than in industrial countries,
and which suggests that capital mobility cannot be measured solely by differences between domestic
savings and investment, as noted above.  All this suggests that to some extent the Feldstein-Horioka
results reflect  the similarity  of their sample  countries  and that capital is mobile  internationally  in response
to long run differences.  in rates of return, even in the face of strong  barriers to capital movements  in some
developing  countries.
Another  critique  of the Feldstein-Horioka  results develops  t ke  argument  that the closeness
of average levels of savings and investment  rates says nothing about whether an exogenous rise in
investment  would  be easily  financed  by inflows  of capital or be limited by domestic saving. In this view,
the true test of capital mobility for similar countries is not a comparison  of their average saving and
investment  rates over long periods, but of the correlations  between changes in saving and changes in
investment  within these periods. There are a number  of reasons  why changes in investment  and saving
rates could  be correlated  in the short run -they may arise from private responses  to shocks  in productivity
(Obstfeld)  or shifts in world interest rates and terms of trade (Persson and Svensson)  or because  fiscal
policy targets  the current account  (Tobin,  Westphal, and Summers)  and thus shifts in public saving  offset
shifts in private saving, which appears  to be true in the data (Bayoumi). However, one could expect that
short run changes  in savings and investmnent  rates are less likely to reflect common underlying  factors,
than data over long periods.  In general, the results of these empirical estimates  ( for example, Caprio
and Howard  (business  cycles), Obstfeld  (quarterly  data)) suggest  that the coefficient  between changes  in
domestic savings  and investment  rates is much  lower than the averages  over long periods, and generally
significantly  less than one but significantly  different  than zero.36  Interpreted  in the spirit of Feldstein  and
Horioka, this result suggests a substantial,  if imperfect  degree of capital mobility.
Another question  revolves  around the source of so-called  capital immobility. Obstfeld's
correlations  of the quarterly  changes  in savings  and investment  rates are inversely  related  to country  size -
- only in the case of the U. S. and Japan, the two largest countries  in the sample, are the correlations
close to one, and in the smaller countries  the correlations  are not significantly  different than zero.  This
result supports Harberger's and Murphy's argument, that for the larger countries, the high correlation
between  domestic saving and investment  rates partially reflects the impact of changes in their domestic
savings and investment  on the world interest rate and other international  variables.  This view also is
supported by Summer's finding that the estimated  coefficient  of the investment  rate on the saving rate
drops when small, less-developed  countries  are included  in the sample.
Bayoumi's paper provides further support for this view, on a broader scale.  Generally
H  Jowever, Fielke' results,  including  non-industrial  countries,  are broadly consistent  with Feldstein-Horioka's.
U  Feldsteh's regreuions of year to year changes  in the domestic  investment  rate on the year to year changes  in the domestic  saving rate
yield a coefficient  of 0.863, from which  he concludes  that  'even year to year increases  in saving  tend to be associated  with increases  domestic
investment  in the saving  country  by approximately  equal amounts'. However,  the standard  error of the regression  coefficient  is 0.04, so strictly
qsaking, the asociation is sgnificantly  less than one to one.20
speaking  the sample  OECD countries  run growing  government  deficits over the period 1966-1986. Tbis
would  tend to increase real world interest rates, ceteris  paribus, and lead to an offsetting  increase in the
average difference  between  private saving  and private investment. Depending  on intercountry  differences
and differences  in country sizes, this would tend to show up in increasingly  lower correlations  between
domestic private saving and investment,  the more so as capital mobility increased - which roughly
corresponds  to Bayoumi's results.27  Moreover, as noted e  Section 1, even in a relatively  small country
the "risk premium' over the world interest rate might be related to the amount  of borrowing.
In evaluating  these results and their implications,  it appears that in the periods studied
there was a fair, though not perfect, degree of capital mobility, where capital mobility is defined in a
net sense, i.e. providing  foreign saving, rather than in a gross sense, as used in this paper.  Even the
point estimates  of the coefficients  of the industrial country regressions  suggest that in the long run net
liabilities  to foreigners  would represent 10-15%  of the capital stock in a country  on average. There also
appears to be even more significant  short run responses  of international  capital to short run variations in
domestic saving and investment. For the developing  countries the relation would be even higher; debt
to GDP ratios suggest that gross foreign commercial  bank debt in some countries is nearly equal to the
capital  stock. (See World  Bank, World  Debt Tables 1990-91),  indicative  of a fairly high degree of capital
mobility  but also perhaps a significant  degree of country  risk.  Finally as noted  earlier, these results say
little about  capital mobility in gross terms, in response  to differences in the autarchic  pricing of risks.
27 Bayoumi  shows  that coefficient  of private  investment on private  ving  in the ,eldstein-Horiok  fomulation falls to insignificance  after
1975. However, hii coefficient  risesafter  198.  At the same  time the regreuion coefficient  of tota  idonmtic invedment  on domenc  aving
falls (to a level significantly  low than one). Whether  one should  try to intetpret  these shifts,  given the small number of observations  (10) and
the corresponding  low power of sutaistical  test on them is quetionable.  However,  one should note that the world pool of saving probably
declined,  relative  to world investment,  after the early I1M,  with the ris  in the U. S. fscal deficit  and the reduced saving  rate of thn major
OPEC producers.21
D.  The Sequendng and Speed of Capital and Current Account  UberaUzation.
D. I  The Preconditions for Capital Account Liberalization
A stable  macroeconomy  is apreconditionto  international  financial  liberalization. Opening
the capital  account  increases  the opportunity  for currency  substitution,  which increases  the rate of inflation
(in domestic currency) needed to  mobilize a given volume of resources through the inflation tax.
However, it is important  to realize, as noted  above, that under conditions  of high and variable inflation
the capital account may, de facto,  be substantially  open.  Leaving the capital market legally closed
increases  the incidence  of the inflation  trx on those without easy access to foreign exchange.
Allowing  easier access  to international  capital  markets  during conditions  of high inflation
also can increase the variability of the economy  substantially. In high inflation,  the domestic currency
money  base falls as a percentage  of GDP. Every nominal  and real shock, and every shift in expectations,
then has a proportionately  greater impact  on domestic  financial  variables. The resulting  variability will
be further magnified  if shifts into foreign exchange  denominated  assets are made less costly by capital
account liberalization  - the money base will become even smaller and the shifts in response to a given
shock will  become even  greater. A sustainable  fiscal deficit,  which requires  only a minimal  inflation  tax,
thus is a particularly  important  precondition  to international,  as well as domestic  financial  liberalization.
External  borrowing, directly  or indirectly,  could, of course, be used to reduce the need
for the inflation  tax and reduce public sector "crowding  out" of domestic investment. 2'  (Notice  that such
increased  external  public sector  borrowing  does not mean international  financial  liberalization  as defined
in the introduction  to this paper.) However, this policy option  is fraught  with dangers, as McKinnon  and
Mathieson  and McKinnon  pointed  out, and as recent experience  suggests. In the late 1970s and early
1980s,  many developing  countries  used substantial  external  borrowing  to avoid  reductions  in public  sector
deficits and to sustain overvalued real exchange rates that were inconsistent with aggregate demand
policy. When the initial  inflow  of funds  slowei, real interest  rates increased, and commodity  prices fell,
the debt crisis occurred, which depressed growth rates for many years in the more severely indebted
countries.  Of course external  borrowing has become difficult  for many developing  countries with the
onset of the debt crisis.
It is sometimes  argued that opening the capital account will force the government to
reduce its reliance on the inflation  tax, by lowering  the base of the tax significantly. This argument is
sometimes  extended  by saying that opening  the capital  account will endow anti-inflation  programs with
greater credibility. To some degree, these arguments  are based on the idea that the inflation  tax results
from the government's rational reflection  on the optimal combination  of taxes.  However, analysis  of
episodes of hyperinflation suggest that these episodes often reflect a desperate attempt to  continue
spending rather than a rational  portfolio decision  about the optimum combination  of taxes.  Moreover,
as noted earlier, governments  that intend  to use the inflation  tax typically  close the capital account first.
This can be done fairly easily, although, once individuals  have built up some assets denominated  in
foreign exchange during the period of an open capital account, it is difficult to re-close the capita!
I  he public  sector can  borrow  abroad  directly,  or the  govemment  can allow  domesic  baks  nd fus  to borow extenly  peaps whh
a government  guarantee),  either way educing the  piesure on the domesic  financial  sydem  from a given  volume  of public sectr borrowing.22
account.  Overall, it would seem that merely opening  the capital  account will not increase  the credibility
of a stabilization  program very much.
Dcmestic financial liberalization,  to a significant  degree, is the second precondition  to
international  financial liberalization. If domestic citizens  are to be given easy access to international
financial  markets, through foreign banks, then the domestic  banking  system must be face essentially  the
same regulations and controls on interest rates/portfolio composition  as foreign banks in their home
markets  to remain competitive. Moreover, the domestic  banks must have sound  portfolios. Unless  these
two conditions  are met, liberalizing  the capital  account is likely to lead to disintermediation  that will put
pressure on the domestic  banking system, force closures of domestic banks and increase claims on the
government, in its role as explicit  or implicit insurer of deposits.
In a financially  closed  economy, the domestic  banking  system often suffers from severe
regulation,  which benefits  the government  and other preferred  borrowers  at a cost to domestic  savers and
non-preferred  borro-:ers.  Perhaps the most important  form of such regulation is the control of interest
rates-portfolio  composition, that manifests  itself in high, non-remunerated  reserves requirements  and
below-market,  directed credit. Such  regulations  lead to large spreads  between  rates on deposits and rates
on non-preferkatial  leans. (Hanson and Rocha)  Once depositors and non-preferred  borrowers obtain
access to  international financial markets, these  spreads make domestic financial intermediaries
uncompetitive  - because  of the regulations  they are unable to set interest rates that will prevent the loss
of deposits and their non-preferential  loan customers. Such regulations  can be applied  to foreign banks
operating  in the domestic  market, but they are likely  to be less effective  than on domestic  banks because:
1) foreign  banks and associated  non-bank  intermediaries  can often  facilitate  transactions  with home  offices
that avoid such regulations or 2) they can avoid such regulations within the country using modern
teIhnology".  Hence, such regulations  reauce the competitiveness  of the domestic  banking  industry, and
are likely to lead to a loss of business  that may imperil  some domestic  banks.
The domestic  banking sector may be charging high spreads because  of high costs and
the need to provision against poor loan performance. High costs may reflect a number of factors in
addition  to poor technology  and management,  such as the sharing of monopolistic  profits with members
of bank unions and extensive  branch  networks  that were useful for capturing  low cost deposits  in a period
when interest rates could not be set competitively. Poor portfolio quality may reflect not only poor loan
decisions and unexpected  shifts in relative prices but high-risk, directed credits and favorable terms to
non-arms length borrowers.  Competition  from foreign banks and an open capital market is useful in
reducing  high spreads  that result from poor technology  and management,  and extensive  branch networks.
Competition also may force better portfolio selection.  However, it probably is desirable for the
govermnent  to take action to reduce costs associated  with the stock of outstanding  bad loans (by filly
recognizing  such loans) and with high labor costs before allowing  foreiga banks to compete  fully with
domestic  bank.  Otherwise  the playing  field will not be fully level for domestic  banks and some  of them
could be imperiled, for example  by the burden of poor portfolio quality, leading to the government's
being forced  to assume responsibility  for their deposits.
D.2  The Sequence of Liberalization: Capital or Current  Account
An  extensive body of  literature focuses on  the  question of  sequencing external
2  For example,  rererequiremmout  must be computed  on soDe deposit base. Computer  programning can be used tr  'sweep'  lag
depoltosjut  before  the deposit  bae  is calculated  and plac tie funds  in accounts  with lower rerve  requirement/higher  Lnterest  rates.23
liberalization,  whether  the capital  or current account  should be opened  first.  Interest in this question  was
particularly aroused  by the different  paths of liberalization  in the Southern  Cone of South  America in the
latter half of the 1970s. Chile is generally  characterized  as liberalizing  the current account  first, Uruguay
and Argentina  the capital account first and, in an influential  paper, McKinnon  (1982) argues that much
of Chile's success, relative to Argentina, is due to the different sequencing  of their reforms (and to
Chile's fiscal surplus as opposed to Argentina's stubborn  fiscal deficit). It should be noted, that there
is a substantial  debate in Chile on the timing of the capital account  liberalization  and Its role in the crisis
of the early 1980s.  Of covrse, a number of other favtors were at work and, eventually, all three
countries' attempts at liberslLation suffered reverses in the debt crisis (See for example, the works
contained  in the Corbo-De  Melo YVrld  Develo  e  Issue, Carbo, De Melo, and Tybout, Edwards  and
Cox-Edwards,  Hanson (1986), and Harberger  (1982)).
The initial view on sequencing  (McKinnon  (1973))  was that capital account restrictions
should be relaxed only after trade reform, and policy makers should 'deliberately avoid an uinusual  or
extraordinary  injection  of foreign capital" (McKinnon  (1973)  p. 161.) The rationale for this view is as
follows:  Current account liberalization  typically requires a real depreciation  of the exchange rate, to
offset the negative effect on the balance of payments of cuts in the average level of protection.  In
contrast,  capital  account  liberalization  tends to produce  a real appreciation  of the exchange  rate. If capital
account  liberalization  were to produce a stable net transfer (capital  inflow, less interest  payments),' then
opening both accounts simultaneously  might yield something like the final real exchange rate and
resources could then be rallocated in accordance  with that objective. However, capital infiow. tnust be
paid for, so the initial net transfer following  the opening  of the capital account is likely to be larger than
the final net transfer (See Annex). Moreover, the responsiveness  of capital to the pent-up demand for
local assets  is likely to be much  faster than the responsiveness  of trade flows  to the opening  of the current
account, leading to an unsustainable  appreciation  of the real exciiange  rate (Frenkel 1982).  Hence,
opening  the capital  account  before  the current account  produces  incentives  for resource  allocation  that will
have to be reversed in the final equilibrium  (Krueger (1986)), and could retard the adjustment  to the
reduction in protection.3 1 To avoid "unnecessary"  resource shifts, a number of authors (for example,
Edwards (1984), Frenkel (1982), Khan and Zahler, McKinnon  (1973, 1982))  have concluded  that it is
preferable  to open the current account  before the capital account.
Theru are, however, some difficulties  with this argument. First, the volume  of capital
resources over time is not nec':sarily the same under the two different sequences of liberalization.
Whenever  the capital  account  liberalization  occurs, it tends  to cause  an appreciation;  the point is that once
protection  is reduced in a capital-scarce  country,  the rate of return is reduced, as discussed  in section  A,
decreasing  the incentive for capital inflows. Thus, there are less "unnecessary"  resource shifts in the
current account-capital  account sequence  in part because there is a smaller stock of capital - the costs
this loWer  capital stock have to be evaluated  relative to the benefits  of lower costs of adjustment.
This type of argument has led some authors (Little Skitovsky, and Scott, Michaely,
Krueger (1981, 1984))  to argue for simultaneous  liberalization  of the current and capital accounts. In
their view, short run adjustment  costs and the opposition  to reforms that they generate are an important
20  lhs  c  is analyzed  in Edwards  (1986)
1Ibis  argummen,  of course, reemrbles  the discuuion  of the  impact  of direct  foreign investment  on the highly  ptcted  lAtin Amerin
eomies  duing the 1960s  (for eample, Diaz Alejndwro).  A number  of theortical studies ugget that  in the presence  of disortions, direct
forig  inve_met can rdue  welfare.24
problem in liberalization. Foreign funds can be used to reduce or offset the costs of these frictions.
Thus, these authors generally  argue that the capital account  should be liberalized  at the same time as or
even prior to the cufrent account. Of course, this argument  is for larger capital inflows; these need not
be provided  through greater individual  access  to foreign capital  (capital account  liberalization)  but could
come through govermment  intermediation  of foreign capital.
These points are examples of a more general questioning  of much of the sequencing
literature.  A stict  economic analysis of sequencing  requiree an intertemporal  analysis, allowing for
different volumes  of capital inflow  as well as different  degrees  of misallocation. Moreover, the analysis
should not be limited only to distortions  between domestic and foreign prices, but should allow for
domestic  distortions  as well.  Some attempts  to carry out this type of analysis have already begun (See
for example, Khan and Zahler, Rodrick, Edwards (1989) s A Edwards and van Wijnbergen); not
surprisingly,  the argument  for the current account-capital  account  sequence  seems to depend on the type
and degree of the initial  distortions. Moreover, the whole sequencing  argument  understates  the benefits
of capital account  liberalization  because  of its neglect  of risk.
D.3  Tl3 S  d gf IUberalzation
Capital  account  liberalization  often  is treated  as instantaneous  in the foregoing  sequencing
literature (See for example  Edwards  (1986) and Frenkel (1982)),  in contrast  to the well-known  debate on
gradual versus rapid trade reform. (See for example,  Krueger (1986), Michaely, and Little, Skitovsky
and Scott, Edwards and van Wijnbergen.) In fact, the capital account may be opened gradually in a
variety of ways, analogously  to the methods  used in opening  the current account  gradually. Fot example,
taxes on capital inflow (including  differential  reserve requirements  on banks' use of foreign capital) can
be varied, or limitations  on banks' and other financial  intermediaries  use of foreign capital  can be varied
as was done to some extent in Chile at the end of the 1970s  (See Edwards and Cox-Edwards)  and again
at the end of the 1980's. Another approach  would  be dual foreign  exchange  markets  - in contrast  to the
usual situation  the rate applicable  to capital account  transactions  would ap=  r  initially  relative to the
current account  rate, which could  be unified once the first burst of capital inflow slowed.32  In principle
such policies would mean that capital account liberalization  could proceed at a pace linked to current
account liberalizaton, thereby avoiding  the overshooting  of the real exchange  rate.  One corollary of this
argument  is that the problem with the capital account  liberalization  in Chile in the latter half of the 1970s
was not opening  of the capital account,  but the abrupt  switch  from  closed  account, which created  pent-
up demand for Chilean assets, to a completely  open account.
The speed of current account liberalization  also is an issue because of positive relation
that exists between expectations  of devaluation  and the domestic interest rate, even in economies with
relatively  closed  capital  accounts  (See Section  B. 1). As noted  in Section  C.2, reduction  of trade barriers
0 As noted  in Section  AS, the difficulty  with  dual foreign  exchange  markets  , of coure, the problcm  of separatg  the two makea  and
the incenives et up to avoid the sepadon.  In the ua  case, ther  is  ome desie to mainin  an overvahed  Xate  for goods trncto  to
avoid  the inflatoay  consequencs of a devaluadon. Capital  flight occurs  depreciating  the rate applicable  to capital  acount tansctions  and
Ceating  incinives to undervalue  expone  and  overvalue  impots, in order  to bring  back  foreign  exchage thaough  the capitl account. In conta,
the problem  with  liberalizing  the  capil  acount dicusd  above  is that tha initial  burst  of capital  inflow  acconanyingthe  opening  of the  capital
accout  t_yorariy  *jmijtp  a unified exchane rte.  'Me inceives  would be to ovmea  expo  and uialu  inmports  to espe  the
e1ffcve tax on caphil inflows, in much  the same  way as expott incentives  in Colombiu  and Turkey  led to 'fictionl'  expors at vaious times.
Since any  epaation of the muarets for foreign  exchange  would be short lived, there probably  would not be time to evolve sophisticated
mechanisms  to ewpe  the separtion of makets.  lhe  chief  difficulty  is likely to be thc,  government's  unwilline  to unify the marete when
the capitl  ccount  rate begins  to drop below the current account  rate.25
typically need to be compensated  by a part passu depreciation  of the real exchange rate to avoid an
increase in the current account  deficit. Generally  it is thought  that this real depreciation  can be achieved
with lower costs  of adjustment  by depreciating  the nominal  exchange  rate, rather than through a reduction
in domesr  c wages and prices. However,  depreciation  in the nominal  exchange  rate tends to raise the xral
interest rate in the economy, because  of the increased gains to be made from holding financial assets
denominated  in foreign exchange. The higher real interest rate tends to depress the rate of investment.
This argument  suggests  that the g  of trade liberalization  and the rate of compensatory
depreciation could be important determinants  of the rate of investment  and growth, even in a fully
credible  process  of liberalization. The relationship  is not linear - very slow trade liberalization  requires
very little compensatory  real depreciation  and hence  has only minimal  effect on the real interest rate and
investment; very rapid trade liberalization  means a  high real interest rate only for a  short period,
thereafter no real devaluation  is needed and the expected  rate of devaluation  and, correspondingly,  the
real interest rate decrease. It is only gradual trade liberalization,  spread over say 3 to 5 years, that is
likely to have an important  effect on the real interest rate and investment. Even in such programs, the
effect could  be limited, by initially  overshooting  the exchange  rate necessary  to maintain  a constant  trade
balance.
An example  may clarify these  points. Consider  a program  of trade liberalization  intended
to reduce the average rate of protection of imports  by 50 percent.  If done over five years at a steady
rate, this might require a real depreciation  of 3-5% per annum  to match the growth of imports to the
higher growth  of exports. However  this depreciation  would  require an increase of 3-5 percentage  points
in the real interest  rate in order to maintain  the attractiveness  of financial  assets denominated  in domestic
currency, relative to those denominated  in foreign currency.  This higher real interest rate would have
a negative  effect on investment. If the trade liberalization  were spread over ten years, the required real
depreciation  and corresponding  increase  in the domestic  real interest  rate would  be small; if the full trade
liberalization  were done at once, or if the exchange  rate were devalued  sharply early in the program of
protection  reduction, then there would be a much smaller effect on the real interest rate.  Clearly the
importance  of this effect varies from country to country, depending  on the degree to which the rate of
depreciation  affects the domestic interest rate and the effect of the domestic interest rate on investment.
However this argument suggests that it should not be  surprising that programs of gradual trade
liberalization show little impact on the rate of growth - such programs tend to depress investment
through their impact  on the real interest  rate and thus reduce the rate of adjustment  to the new incentive
framework.26
E.  Summary  and  Conclusions
The question of the costs and benefits of opening  the capital account has become moot
to some degt-e.  Defacto,  capital  has become internationalized  by the growing  integration  of the world
economy. Compared  to, say, the 1960s,  economic  agents  have much  greater access to foreign currency
assets.  This reflects the freer international  mobility  of goods, people, and information,  as well as the
greater legal availability  of such assets in the domestic financial system of many countries.  In many
cases, for individuals  and non-financial  firms, it is not access  but the menu of assets that is limited. This
limitation  largely reflects the remaining  restrictions  on financial firms.  It nonetheless  seems useful to
examine  the costs and benefits  of opening  the capital  account, the empirical  results of opening  the capital
account, and the timing and sequencing  of opening  the capital account, in order to assist countries in the
process of capital account liberalization.
Theoretically,  perhaps the main benefit in opening  the capital account - in the sense of
allowing individuals  and firms full access to international  capital markets - seems to come from the
greater scope for exercising  individual  choice in diversifying  risk.  If domestic and  international  prices
of risky assets differ, then there are benefits  from allowing  individuals  to trade assets  or goods and assets.
These benefits are analogous  to the benefits  of free trade in goods, and, correspondingly,  are subject  to
many of the same caveats  as the arguments  for free trade.
The traditional argument for opening the capital account in developing countries is
somewhat  different - that capital inflows will finance increased investment  more cheaply, in terms of
foregone  consumption,  than domestic  saving. This argument,  is perhaps less forceful  in theoretical  terms
than the risk diversification argument.  First, under this argument, the benefit of  capital account
liberalization  is much  smaller, as it is based only on the difference  between  capital inflows  and outflows.
Ignoring  the benefit from trading in risk is roughly analogous  to saying that the benefit from free trade
is based on the difference between exports and imports.  Second, focussing  on this argument raises a
problem of evaluating  the benefits, to the extent that the reduction in the rate of return, as a result of
increased  capital flows, reduces  the domestic saving rate.
Third, if the only rationale for capital flows were an excess of riskdess  investment
opportunities  over domestic saving at the world interest rate, then, in theory, a credible, maximizing
government could borrow funds internationally and  either reduce domestic  "crowding out",  or
intermediate  these funds through the domestic  financial  system.  There would be no need for individual
economic  agents to access international  capital markets. The traditional  argument also does not imply
a need to open both sides of the capital account. From the standpoint  attracting foreign investors, who
are interested  only in transferring  their earnings,  the question  is one of the current account, not the capital
account. Guarantees  of convertibility  for debt service  and profits, in theory, could  be given. In practice,
of course, many govermnents  have found it difficult  to carry out such intermediation  effectively, or to
offer credible guarantees.  Governments  often have over-borrowed to support excessive deficits and
overvalued  exchange  rates, have invested  in numerous  "white  elephants", and have been lax in recovering
on-lending when international  funds have been intermediated  through the domestic financial system.
Governments also have suspended guarantees of profit remittances during foreign exchange crises.
Experience  thus suggests that, in practice, opening  the capital account may be a more effective  way to
mobilize  and allocate international  funds.  This argument for opening  the capital account is particularly
true for foreign  direct investment,  which is often  motivated  less by considerations  of financing  investment
and more by considerations  of technology  transfer, management  improvement,  risk diversification,  etc.27
The standard  argument  against  an open capital account in a developing  country is that it
would cost the country much of its saving.  To some extent, such capital outflow may represent
diversification  of underlying country risk, not related to economic  policy.  Inflows also may occur as
foreigners attempt  to diversify  country  risk; the net flow resulting  from the diversification  of underlying
country  risk will depend on the country's underlying  characteristics  and the degree to which it develops
instruments  to allow the diversification  of risk
To a greater degree the loss-of-saving  argument  probably reflects the diversification  of
risk arising from economic  policy and is a reflection  of the limitations  that an open capital  account  places
on the taxation of income from capital and financial assets.  To the extent the capital account is closed
defacto, developing  countries  are able  to tax financial  assets  and, to a lesser extent, capital. If the capital
account were open, then capital flight would occur unless such taxation were reduced.  This  is
particularly  true given the tax shelters  for external  funds in many industrial countries, as well as in the
tax havens, which in fact are being  used by many citizens  of developing  countries.
Countries  using the inflation  tax, or in which there is a future risk of the inflation tax,
are particularly vulnerable  to the potential loss of saving. Inflation, or the threat of inflation, leads to
growing  use of foreign exchange  in transactions  and a reduction  in the yield of the inflation  tax, the more
so as the capital account is opened. This limitation  on the use of the inflation  tax should not, however,
be considered  a cost, since  this tax is one that does not require  public approval;  falls heaviest  on the poor,
who have a large share of their portfolio in local currency assets with zero or fixed interest rates, and
has very distortionary  effects, particularly in the financial  system.  Indeed, opening  the capital account
might even be considered  to improve  the income  distribution,  because it equalizes  access  to international
assets at the same time as it reduces the base of the inflation  tax.
Since opening the capital account reduces the incentive for reliance on the inflation tax, it
sometimes  is argued  that an open capital  account  represents  a signal  that the government  will refrain from
using the inflation tax.  Interestingly, the signal is certainly a  weak one,  since the first act of a
government  intending  to use the inflation  tax is to close the capital  market.
An open capital  account  also limits a country's ability  to conduct  monetary/exchange  rate
policy and increases  exposure  to international  monetary  shocks. With an open capital account, attempts
at targeting the monetary stock through open market operations tend to be offset by economic  agents
undertaking  capital flows (at the government  set exchange  rate) in order to obtain their desired stocks  of
financial  assets at the prevailing  international  interest rate.  The loss of monetary independence  implied
by open capital markets  also is felt in the greater exposure  to international  monetary  shocks, through the
capital as well as the current account.
In an open economy, interest  rate targeting  may temporarily  enjoy greater success than
attempts  to target the money stock, but carries with it some problems. A government  may offer bonds
above  or lend below international  interest  rates and thereby effect the domestic interest rate, but only so
long as it is willing  to run down its =  international  asset position. Offers  of loans or rollovers  of bonds
at less than world rates will lead to capital  flight and loss of international  reserves.  However, offers of
interest rates above  international  rates also lead  to a decline  in fl  international  assets, because  the influx
of foreign funds takes place at a negative  spread on the bonds that are sold.  In either case the ultimate
result will be a rise in the iiterest rate premium facing the country in international  markets.
Monetary  independence  can  be restored at the cost of the government's  giving  up control28
over the nominal exchange  rate and allowing  it to float freely.  However, a free float clearly entails an
increase in the variability of the exchange rate and correspondingly  greater risks for exporters and
importers  than a fixed rate system. Countries  occasionally  have tried to obtain monetary independence
and maintain control over the exchange rate for trade by applying a  free float to  capital account
transactions  - In effect trying to create another policy instrument. However, the difference between
exchange rates in the two markets, and thus the degree of monetary independence,  clearly is limited  by
arbitrage  possibilities.
Most of the evidence  on the impact  of opening  the capital  account  relates to industrialized
countries.  There has been no analysis  of the benefits of risk diversification  or even the size of such
diversification,  except to point out that the volume of gross capital flows has grown far faster than the
rest of the balance  of payments. Empirical analyses  concentrates  on two issues:  the degree to which
foreign  capital inflows  finance  domestic  investment  and the degree to which uncovered  interest rate parity
typically  is achieved. In general, the results for industrial countries  suggest:
i)  Foreign  capital flows (net)  finance on  average, only  10-15% of  investment in
indusialized  countries.  Various authors have argued that this result reflects similarities in
savings and investment  functions in these countries, similarities in the business cycle across
developed countries, policy related shifts within domestic saving/investment  that do not affect
external  finance, country  size/risk premium effects as well as imperfect  capital mobility.
II)  Uncovered  interest  rate parity typically  is not achieved  even  between  industrial  countries.
It is not clear if this is reflects a market failure, econometric  difficulties  with the model (the
estimates typically are a joint test of  the hypothesized pattern of expectations and market
equilibrium),  or variations in the risk premium.
Regarding studies on the developing countries, there are no specific studies of the
financing  of investment. Some of the studies of foreign capilal inflows in industrial countries include
developing  countries;  this Inclusion  (and  studies including  more  smaller industrial  economies)  suggest  that
foreign saving  represents  a larger fraction  of investment  than in the larger industrial  countries. (However,
the developing  country  results may reflect  large aid flows  to countries  with low incomes  and/or statistical
difficulties,  rather than larger private  flows.) Data  on the gross stak  of external  debt suggest  a high ratio
of external  debt to domestic  capital stock in many developing  countries,  which is also indicative  of large
flows.
Regarding Interest rates, many of the studies in developing countries also analyze the
extent of uncovered interest parity, usually allowing for a constant risk premium.  A number of these
studies are of Latin American  countries  during  periods when they  followed  a policy  of using the exchange
rate (and in some cases the interest rate) to slow inflation.  This suggests the possibility of a "peso"
problem In the estimates  - that expectations  of devaluation  may well  have been high and even increasing
over time but standard, distributed lag approaches  to estimating expectations  suggest a long period in
which uncovered interest parity, even allowing  for a constant risk premium, does not hold.  In recent
periods the 'risk premium" in these countries  may  have risen because  of their external  debt overhang-this
reflects  t only risks of higher taxes (including inflation)  to service debt, but also the alternative  of
investing in  external debt, an option that  is increasingly feasible given the growing breadth and
sophistication  of that market. Recent studies of a more diversified  sample  of countries  with more stable
macoeconomic environments,  suggest  that the domestic  interest  rates tend to follow ;nternational  interest
rates to a fair degree, after appropriate  allowance  for a risk premium. These  analyses  suggest  that capital29
mobility,  although  imperfect, may  have reduced  domestic  interest rates  by as much as 5 percentage  points
compared  to the autarchic situation.
This analysis  suggests  that developing  countries  would  obtain some  benefits  from opening
up the capital account, even leaving aside  the benefits  from trading in riWky  assets. 'he  financing  of the
10-15% of  investment, suggested by the developed country studies, would be  welcome in  many
developing  countries,  especially  if accompanied  by improved  technology  and management. The potential
reduction in the interest rate also seems fairly sizeable.
The sequencing  and speed of capital  account  liberalization  remain important  issues. The
preconditions  for capital account liberlization are a sound fiscal/monetary  situation and a reasonably
sound and liberalized  domestic financi  system.  The need for fiscal control is perhaps best illustrated
by the experience of some countries in Latin America.  Large public sector deficits were financed
increasingly  with exteral  funds. When exchange  rate policy became  clearly inconsistent  with the fiscal
deficit and  external borrowing became clearly unsustainable, capital flight ensued and additional
borrowing was done to sustain the exchange rate.  Given the magnitude  of  the policy errors, capital
flight would  have developed  in any case. However,  the degree  of openess  of the capital account  certainly
contributed  to the capital flight and excess borrowing.
The rationale  for a reasonably  liberalized  and sound  financial  system  has no corresponding
illustration. However,  it is important  to adjust  financial  regulations  such as reserve requirements,  capital
requirements, portfolio composition (including limits on  offshore investments) and  interest rate
limitations,  as well as labor restrictions, so that domestic  institutions  do not face unfair competition  from
foreign institutions.  If the regulatory framework favors external institutions significantly, then it
eventually  may lead to bankruptcy  of domestic institutions  and require costly government support for
depositors.  Similarly, unless the domestic institutions, are reasonably sound, then allowing foreign
institutions  Into the domestic  market is likely to put excessive  pressure on domestic institutions.  Either
the government  must clean up the portfolios  of domestic institutions,  or the institutions  must be allowed
to earn high enough  profits to recuperate  themselves, before liberalization.
The sequencing  of capital account and current account liberalization  has been analyzed
at length.  Conventional  wisdom seems to be that the current account should be liberalized  before the
capital account.  The  argument is  that the responsiveness of  financial flows to  capital account
liberalization  typically  would lead to an unwarranted  real appreciation  of the real exchange  rate and an
incorrect  allocation  of investment  between  tradeables  and non-tradeables.  However,  this argument  neglect
the points that a) whenever the capital account liberalization occurs it would tend to  cause a real
appreciation  and b) the amounts  of resources available  to an economy  would be greater if the capital
account were liberalized earlier.  The positive impact of capital account liberalization on resource
availability  has led some authors to argue for simultaneous  current and capital account liberalization.
Other authors  have  pointed  out that the optimum  sequencing  of liberalization  depends  on the type and size
of distortions  prior to liberalization.
The traditional literature on sequencing current and capital account liberalization seems to
consider  capital account liberalization  as occurring all at once, while current account liberalization  can
take place at various rates - witness the whole argument regarding the appropriate pace of cutting
protection. In fact, capital account  liberalization  also can take place over time - various instruments  and
institutions  can be legalized  at different  times and the size  of operations  can be limited  to varying  degrees,
although  such limitations are probably less effective  than similar trade limitations.30
The recognition  that current account liberalization  can take place at varying speeds also
suggests  some undesired  interactions  can occur between the current and capital account.  In particular,
a slow  current account  liberalization  may  require a compensating  real devaluation  over a number  of years.
The implied  upward pressure on the real interest rate via the capital account may discourage  domestic
investment,  particularly in non-traded  goods.  This suggests  that the economic  response to slow trade
liberalizations  may be less than to rapid trade liberalizations  and that exchange rate policy during the
perid  of trade liberalization  should to take into account  the capital  as well as the current account.31
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C:CAPITAL.ACCAnnex
The Neoclassical Growth Model and Capital Inflows
Tbhs  Annex analyzes the role of capital flows  within the context of the standard, one
sector, constant returns to scale, neoclassical growth model.  The analysis  of capital flows based on
the Harrod-Domar model suggests that capital inflows  will tend to raise the growth rate, compared
to a closed economy. However, the solution is very much a knife edge, in keeping with the strong
assumptions of the model (Domar, Johnson).  A number of later studies analyze growth in open
economies with neoclassical,  as opposed to fixed proportion production functions (See for example,
Borts and Stein, Hanson (1974), Hanson and Neher, Fisher and Frenkel, and Frenkel).  This annex
draws together some of the results of these studies.
This annex carries out  the analysis of capital inflows,  using a variant of the marginal
productivity  of capital diagram (Hanson and Neher) that also has been used in the traditional analysis
of the welfare implications of foreign investment (MacDougall).  The horizontal axis of Figure 1
measures the capital to labor ratio, k, the capital intensity. The vertical axis measures flows per year
in percentage terms such as the average product of capital or the marginal product of capital, which
in this simple, one-good model can be identified with the rate of profit or the rate of interest.  In
Figure 1, the iines AA'  and AM 'represent  the average product of capital, 0K,  and the marginal
product of capital respectively, drawn as straight lines for simplicity of graphical analysis.  The
average and marginal  productivity fall as capital intensity increases because of the law of diminishing
returns to a variable factorY  Also shown is the constant growth rate of labor, g, as the horizontal
line GG '.
Growth in the Closed Economy
The analysis  begins by analyzing  neoclassical  growth in a closed economy. For simplicity
assume a constant, Keynesian type saving ratio out of income, s.  With saving equal to investment,
the growth rate of capital is simply sOC/K,  shown graphically  as KA',  proportionate to AA'Y
With the addition of the growth rate of capital line KA',  Figure 1 becomes a phase
diagram of the growth rate of the capital labor ratio.  The long run equilibrium capital labor ratio is
determined by the intersection of the downward  sloping growth rate of capital, KA', and the constant
growth rate of labor, GO '.Y If the capital to labor ratio initially  is less than K'II,  then capital grows
faster than labor, increasing the capital labor ratio. However, the increase in capital intensity reduces
the average product of capital because of the law of diminishing  returns.  Hence the growth rate of
y The assumption  of a constant returns to scale, neoclassical  production function means that the average product of capital is a
function of the capital labor ratio, i.e., a doubling of the inputs results in a doubl:ng of the outputs, leaving the average productivity  of
either factor the same.
y Depreciation is ignored.
3Ie  Ib dstence condition for the long run equilibrium is that the average product of capital is a continuous function that approaches
Infinity  kor at least is larger than gls) as the capital labor ratio becomes small and is less thar. the growth rate of labor (specifically,






. . - \  -A  A
rb
o  Kg  K2  K  D
Ll  L2 L'  LA -3
capital declines. This reduces the difference between the growth rate of capital and the growth rate
of labor.
Eventually, the capital labor ratio converges to K 1/L'.  Since capital and labor are both
growing at the rate g, then income also grows at the rate g.  The analysis can easily be reversed
for the case when the initial capital labor ratio is less than K1/L 1.
In this simplest of neoclassical  growth models, output per unit of labor is constant in the
growth equilibrium. This result clearly is unrealistic. However, the model can be modified easily to
generate a constant increase in output per unit of labor by adding Harrod-neutral technical progress
(pure labor augmentation).  With such technical progress, each laborer's productivity  increases each
year by p percent.  The labor force can now be redefined in terms of efficiency units, equivalent to
the productivity  of a laborer in some base year, with a corresponding redefinition of the capital labor
ratio.  In these efficiency units, the (efficiency)  labor force grows at g+p percent per year (ignoring
the cross product term which is small). In the long run equilibrium, capital and output grow at the
same rate as efficiency labor, following  the arguments discussed above.  The capital per efficiency
laborer and the output per efficiency  laborer are constant in this long run equilibrium analogously
to the simplest model.  However, since the number of efficiency laborers per laborer increases by p
percent annually, the output per 'aborer also increases by p percent per year.
Growth  in the Open Economy wltl Capital Inflows
The simplest way to analyze the impact of capital inflows on neoclassical growth is to
consider a small open economy that, analogously to the small open economy of international trade
theory, faces a horizontal supply of capital at a constant interest rate, r,.  The constant world rate is
assumed to be below the domestic interest rate,  r,  that would prevail in the  absence of capital
movementsY
The implication of the horizontal supply curve of capital is that foreign capitalists send
capital into the economy to whatever extent that domestic investment opportunities, crea.ed at the
world interest rate, exceed saving by nationals.  This flow of capital ensures, by assumption and
ignoring the time needed to adjust portfolios,  that the domestic rate of interest equals the world rate.
The corresponding capital stock thus is maintained at all times.  Hence, rises or falls in saving by
nationals have no effect on the productivity  of capital; they only raise or lower the proportion of the
capital stock owned domestically. This is in contrast to the closed economy model where increases
in the saving rate increase the long run capital labor ratio, and reduce the marginal productivity of
capital.
/  Income  growth could be represented in the graph as a downward  sloping line (not shown) between the growth rate of capital and
the growth rate of labor, since income growth can be shown,  by Euler's Rule, to be a weighted average of the growth rates of capital
and labor, with the weights  equal to the elasticities  of output with respect to the two factors.
/  The interest rate r, can include a constant risk premium. To the anent that extemal lendem consider the probability of default or
expropriation to be positively related to the volume  of foreign capital, even a small economy may face an upward sloping supply
schedule of capltsl and may find it beneficial to iimit foreign bonrwing to some cxtent because of the difference between the marginal
and average cost of external capital (Kemp, Hanson (1974)). However, this complication  is Ignored  in the following  analysis for the
sake of simplicity.A -4
The welfare  analysis  of capital  flows  in this context is most easily carried out holding
fixed  the initial  capital  labor ratio, i.e., assuming  a constant  amount  of saving  per worker,  as is done
in the traditional  analysis  (MacDougall)  rather than a constant saving  rate.  Analogously  to the
welfare  analysis  of trade, the small  open economy  is assumed  to be at long run, closed  equilibrium
with an initial  capital  labor ratio KYL'  and interest rate r,. Once  the economy  is opened up to capital
flows,  the capital  labor ratio increases  to KIVL 2, and the interest rate falls  to r,Y  Foreigners  now
hold part of the capital stock -- KW/L  - K 1 = D/L --  They receive r, D/L (the rectangle bc K/L2
K',?'!  in the Figure 1) in facto;.  payments.' In the new, long run equilibrium,  output, labor, capital,
and capital  inflows  all grow  at the same  rate, g, as in the closed  economy.
Factor  payments  to foreign  capitalists  make  it important  to distinguish  between  domestic
income  and national  income  in evaluat.ng  welfare. Graphically,  domestic  income  is the area (integral)
under the marginal  productivity  curve,  while  national  income is domestic  income less payments  to
borrowers,  r, D/L.  Thus, national  income increases  by the triangle  "abc",  provided the saving  of
nationals  continues  to maintain  their ownership  of K 1ILI  units of capitaly
The increase  in national income  can be explained  heuristically  as follows:  The rise in
capital,  because  of the capital inflow,  lowers  the rate of return to capital and raises  the wage  rate.
Within  national  income  this simply  represents  a shift in the distribution  of income  from  capitalists  to
laborers. However, the non-marginal  increase in foreign-owned  capital also means that foreign
capitalists  suffer from the reduction in the rate of return -- in effect, the "late"  arrivals,  in their
competition  for labor to work with their capital, bid up wages and reduce the rate of return on
capitaL The increase  in wages,  at the expense  of foreign  capitalists,  raises  national  income  above  its
autarcnic  level.
It also is important  to note that this increase  in national  income  occurs  even  if more  is
paid  out in interest to foreign  capitalists  than is received  in new  direct foreign  investment,  i.e.,  even
if net transfers  are negative. As noted above,  annual  payments  of interest to foreigners  are rwD/L.
New  foreign  capital  is gDlL  in the long  run equilibrium,  when capital,  labor and income  are growing
at the rate g. Hence, net transfers  are negative  or positive  as r, is greater or less than g. However,
following  the argument  in the previous  paragraph,  welfare  improves  whatever  the relative  magnitudes
of r. and I.  Foreigners  will  maintain  capital  above the autarchic  level  at a lower  cost than domestic
citizens  would be willing  to do so (r.<r,),  benefitting  domestic  wages  at the expense of foreign
capitals.
§/ This analysts  assumes capital inflows  instantaneously  reduce the domestic interest rate to "world' levels. The "world' level can
include a coonstant  risk premium.
7/  mif  anatysis  ignors  the transfer problem.
g/  Notice thait  if saving  is a proportionate raction of national income, then the domestically  owned capital stock Increases. On the
other hand, the fall in the rate of return to saving may lower the rate of saving. The domestic capital stock rises or falls depending on
the net of these two offsetting movements  See the section on the Simple Welfare Aspects of Capital Movements,  below, for a further
dicussion of national  savngA -5
Comparative  Statics
A rise in the world interest rate, r,, because  of a rise in the risk  premiun,  for example,
tends to lower the desired  amount of external  capital  in the small,  open economy,  and reduce the
capital  labor ratio. Graphically,  a rise in r. shifts  upward  the horizontal  supply  schedule  of extemal
capital. Given  the domestic  marginal  productivity  of capital  schedule,  the desired  amount  of foreign
capital  in the economy  falls. Unless  the domestic  saving  rate rises to offset the decline  in foreign
investment,  i.e., the economy  becomes  an exporter of capital as a result of the rise in the world
interest rate, the capital  labor ratio in the economy  also would  fall.
A change in the terms of trade is not easily  modelled  in the one commoclity  world.
However,  some heuristic  results  can be derived  by assuming  that capital  goods  are wholly  imported
at a fixed  price,  and are not the same  as the good produced  in the economy.  A shift in the terms  of
trade, is then, effectively  a similar proportionate shift in the marginal and average productivity
schedules  of capital. Thus,  a decline  in the terms  of trade of the domestically  produced  good against
the capital  good would  be shown  as a propo.Lionate  downward  shift of the marginal  and average
productivity  schedules. With a fixed  world interest rate and constant domestically  owned capital,
foreign  capital  would  decline.
Simple  Welfare  Aspects  of Cap,tal Movements
As noted above,  the gains  from capital  inflows  reflect the decline  in the rate of return
paid to the "first"  foreign  capitalists  to invest in the economy. The same result can be shown in
differential  terms, rather than discrete  changes. National  income (GNP) is
(Al)  GNP  =  f '(k + W) - f 'D/L
where f  =  Marginal  Productivity  of Capital
W  =  Ratio of Wages  to rental on Capital.
Differentiating  with respect  to D/L, holding  the domestically  owned  capital  stock  constant,  yields
(A2)  dGNP/dD  =  -f"  >  .
A critical  point  in evaluating  welfare  is that it is done holding  the volume  of domestically
owned  capital  stock  constant In some  sense,  this is the inital situation  when moving  from autarchy
in capital  movements  to free capital  movements  -- at that point the domestically  owned  capital  stock
is fixed. The analysis  shows  that with the domestically  owned  capital  stock held fixed,  potentially
there is a rise in GNP -- it would  be possible  for the gainers  from capital  inflows  to compensate  the
losers from  capital  flows  and still  have  something  left over. Thus,  welfare  is increased  by  free capital
movements  in the same sense that welfare  is increased  by free trade.
The actual  outcome,  particularly  in terms  of GNP, may,  however,  be somewhat  different
because  of changes  in the saving  rate. The decline  in the rate of return when the economy  is opened
up to capital  movements  may  decrease  the rate of saving. This will tend to decrease the national
ownership  of the capital  stock  and national  income. On balance,  the capital  stock  and the national
income  will rise or fall, depending  on whether the negative  effect of the lower interest rate onA -6
national  saving  is greater or less  than the tendency  for national  income  to rise because  of the lower
returns earned by the "initial"  foreign  investors.
Thus far the analysis  of welfare  has been conducted  in terms  of GNP. However,  it also
is worth examining  the implications  of capital  inflows  for national  consumption.  The willingness  of
foreign  capitalists  to support the domestic  capital  stock  at a fixed  interest rate offers the possibility
of raising  consumption  per head, even if GNP falls.
The gain  in consumption  from  a given  change  in the equilibrium  nationally-owned  capital
stock (E[L=e), brought about by a change in the saving  rate, is equal to the change in national
income  minus  the change  in national  saving.  The change  in national  income  is  simply  f ', the marginal
productivity  of capital  -- under the assumptions  of the model,  foreigners  will  replace  the reduction
in domestically  owned capital stock at a cost of r,  = f '.  The change in national saving  can be
derived  by differentiating  the equilibrium  condition  for national  saving:
(A3)  sf '(e+W)  = ge
with respect  to e.  Thus the change  in national  saving  implied  by a unit change in national  capita.  is
g.  National  consumption  will  rise or fall,  in the long  run with a rise in e, as rW  exceeds  or is less  than
g.  These results are nothing  more than the standard  golden rule analysis,  extended to an open
economy  (Hanson and Neher).  However,  as with golden  rule analysis  in the closed  economy,  there
is a transition  problem.
Consider, first, the situation where r,  is less than the equilibrium  rate of domestic
growth,  g. Foreigners  wfll  support the domestic  capital  stock  at r, a lower  cost,  in terms  of foregone
consumption  than domestic  saving,  g. Hence,  it pays  to reduce  saving  in order to raise consumption
in the present as well as the future. The degree to which  this saving  policy  can be pursued may,
however,  be limited by a rising  risk premium as foreigners  begin to own more and more of the
domestic  capital  stock (Hanson (1974)).
The intertemporal  welfare  analysis  is more complicated  in the case in which  r, exceeds
g. The comparison  across  dynamic  equilibria  suggests  that higher  saving  rates would  pay  off through
reduction of  "expensive"  foreign capital, in terms of  more consumption  in  the  new, growth
equilibrium However,  in the short run until domestically-owned  capital increases,  higher saving
implies  lower  consumption. The fact that r, and rd initially  exceed  g implies  that individuals  value
consumption  fairly  highly.  After  all,  any  individual  by  reducing  consumption  today  and  saving  enough
to raise  his capital  one unit, could  raise  future consumption  by (1  + re). That this is not done in the
aggregate,  and that foreign  capital  is required to bring  the rate of return down to r,, suggests  that
individuals  value current consumption  fairlf highly  and would  be made worse  off by a forced rise in
saving,  despite the eventual  rise in long run consumption  per capita.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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